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Predictive applications of a debarment list involve gathering historical data in the list to 
capture the relationships between the relevant variables in the data to predict the most 
likely future outcomes. Exploring whether the data in the debarment list could produce 
predictive analytics, which agencies may use to deter contractors from committing fraud, 
is unknown. This study closed the literature gap through a quantitative nonexperimental 
analysis of secondary data, inspired by real-life administrative decisions. The purpose of 
this study was to analyze the City of Chicago’s debarment list to determine the statistical 
probability of business entities that may be debarred from receiving contract awards from 
the City. The study’s theoretical foundation was predicated on deterrence theory, with a 
conceptual framework that offered a practical explanation of the dynamics of the 
debarment deterrence sanction system. The number of debarred contractors sampled from 
the City’s debarment list in the fiscal year 2008 to 2019 was N = 138. Results of binomial 
logistic regression showed that procurement fraud is 50.7% as likely as to cause a firm 
debarred from receiving contracts from the City compared with an individual. However, 
procurement fraud is 72.60% as likely as to cause the City to debar an individual from 
receiving City contracts compared with a firm. The model showed that phony company 
fraud is 21.3 times more likely than contract fraud to trigger a firm’s debarment. The 
predictions in this study have social implications for strengthening the use of debarment 
for fraud prevention, public advocacy, and better public funds management and positive 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
A debarment list is an essential and highly sought-after exclusion record. Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR, 2014) requires federal government agencies to compile the 
debarment list of debarred individuals or firms on the web-based System for Award 
Management (SAM) exclusion records maintained by General Services Administration 
(GSA). Also, government agencies are required to check the debarment list to avoid 
unintentionally soliciting offers from, or awarding contracts to, contractors on the list 
(FAR, 9.404 (c)(5)). In debarment practices, the debarment list has gained contractors’ 
attention: it serves as a deterrent resource, which government contractors can perceive as 
a source of sanction threat that can affect their present integrity and loss of business 
opportunities with public agencies at all levels of government. A contractor listed in the 
debarment list is automatically disqualified from receiving contract awards from the 
government for a specified period (Levy & Wagner, 2018).  
In this study, I explored the extent to which the variables of contractor location, 
debarment fraud and length of debarment are associated with the probability of getting a 
business entity excluded from receiving contract awards from the City of Chicago. No 
previous studies examined whether the data in a debarment list have predictive 
capabilities. The study showed that the ability to deter public procurement fraud might be 
subject to the predictive capability of relevant fraud data in a debarment list. This study 
provides scholarly knowledge on the statistical information that may enable procurement 
leaders and policymakers to utilize the debarment list to improve debarment practices.  
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The organization of this study is as follows: Chapter 1 introduces the study’s 
background with further emphasis on the research problem, research question, purpose of 
study, and the other contexts that guide the study. Chapter 2, the literature review, 
explicates current studies on debarment practices related explicitly to the debarment list. 
It also provides scholarly information on deterrence theory, which formed the theoretical 
foundation of the study. Chapter 3 provides the overall methodological approach for the 
study, including the use of the research design, collection of data, and data analysis plan 
to advance the purpose statement and research question of the study. Chapter 4 presents 
clarity of statistical analysis and predictive modeling results obtained from binomial 
logistic regression analyses. The chapter also provides step-by-step modeling techniques 
that are particularly relevant to the study; the hypotheses were tested, and the research 
question answered. In Chapter 5, I interpret the results of the findings, focusing on the 
variables of interest in the study. In this concluding chapter, I discuss the limitations and 
implications of the study and offer policy recommendations, some of which invite a 
paradigm shift to adopt artificial intelligence techniques to enhance predictive 
applications of debarment list in public procurement.  
Background of the Study 
An ancient moral law established that: “You shall not steal, nor deal falsely, nor 
lie to one another” (Leviticus 19:11, NKJV). The acts of fraudulent misconduct, which 
includes but is not limited to stealing, cheating, robbery, false claims, and wage fraud, 
have been part of human existence in many human endeavors (Exodus 20:15-17; 
Leviticus 19:13). As it was in the old times, so it is in public procurement in these 
3 
 
modern times. Extant studies have confirmed that public procurement fraud and corrupt 
practices perpetrated by unscrupulous contractors are still prevalent (Achua, 2011; 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2018; Miranzo, 2017; Rose-Ackerman & 
Palifka, 2016; Rustiarini, Nurkholis, & Andayani, 2019; Schuchter & Levi, 2016; The 
Project on Government Oversight, 2019; Transparency International, 2014; Trepte, 
2005). Procurement fraud has led to wasteful use of taxpayers’ money (Brink, 2013; 
Guile, 2010; Mogner & Chene, 2014; Tracy & White, 2011).  
Public procurement fraud is a widespread phenomenon; it is evident at the global, 
national, and local government levels. For example, at the global level, Spruill (2014) 
reported that an estimated average of $9.5 trillion is spent globally on public contracts, 
out of which Transparency International (2014) estimated at least $2 trillion would 
“disappear from annual procurement budgets” (p. 8). At the national level, total 
procurement fraud settlements and judgments in the United States between 2009 and 
2015 were estimated at $4 billion (Barger & Walthall, 2016). Federal spending on 
purchasing of goods and services during the 2019 fiscal year accounted for about $4.4 
trillion (USAspending.gov, 2019). Procurement in the government sector is enormous 
and complex, and government agencies spend taxpayers’ money to buy goods and 
services to fulfill its obligations and optimize public welfare (Cibinc & Nash, 1986; U.S. 
Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2011). At the local government level, 
Quarterly Reports from 2015 through 2019 published by the Office of Inspector General 
(OIG) at the City of Chicago showed that procurement fraud perpetrated by the City’s 
contractors had become part of the drivers for economic loss for the City in terms of costs 
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of fraud. For easy reference in this study, the word “City” may be used to denote the City 
of Chicago.  
The nature of corruption in government procurement is complex (Williams-
Elegbe, 2012) and difficult to detect (Wang, 2016) because fraudulent contractors can 
defraud the government at any stage of the procurement activities (Caulfield, 2014; 
Green, 2013). Taxpayers’ money ought to be protected and directed to fund procurement 
of goods and services for the common good of the people (Peltier-Rivest, 2018; Pieth, 
2005; Schultz, 2004; Tracy & White, 2011). To protect the interests of U.S. government, 
FAR (2014) requires government agencies to request bids from or award contracts to 
contractors that are only presently responsible [(16 48 C.F.R. § 9.402(a)]. The U.S. 
government is currently using debarment and suspension as one of the fraud-preventive 
programs to protect itself from procurement fraud, waste, and abuse (GSA, 2019). A 
debarment and suspension initiative to protect the government interests is through the 
debarment list. FAR (2014) has prescribed that agencies should compile the debarment 
list of debarred contractors. As such, a contractor listed in the debarment list cannot 
receive contracts from the government agencies for a fixed period. The debarment list is a 
government repository that contains information about contractors determined to be 
ineligible to receive contracts from the government (American Bar Association [ABA], 
2018).  
It is practically impossible for government agencies to plan and spend vast sums 
of public funds to buy goods and services devoid of contractors’ procurement misconduct 
such as corruption, waste, fraud, collusion, coercive, and abuse practices. Otherwise, 
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there would be no need for debarment sanctions, and by extension, there would be no 
need for keeping a debarment list. The government uses debarment and suspension as 
statutory and discretionary tools to prevent public procurement fraud, waste, and abuse 
(GSA, 2019). A suspension is a temporary remedy to disqualify a nonresponsible 
contractor from receiving government contracts. At the same time, a debarment excludes 
nonresponsible contractors from receiving government contracts for a fixed period after 
debarment procedures (FAR, 2014). For simplicity in this study, suspension and 
debarment generally will be denoted as “debarment.” Debarment sanction is a public 
procurement regulation the U. S. government uses as the last resort to protect its interests 
(Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee [ISDC], 2019).  
Some government agencies’ response to prevent fraudulent and corrupt 
procurement practices is exclusion action to debar contractors from partaking in 
government procurement for a fixed time (Gordon, 2013; Tillipman, 2013). For example, 
the U.S. government has implemented 10,982 debarments between Fiscal Year 2009 and 
2017 (ISDC, 2019). A debarment is implemented in all three government levels in the 
United States (Williams-Elegbe, 2012). At the municipal government level, the City of 
Chicago’s debarment procedures mirror the federal government’s procedures. The City 
applies a debarment sanction program to stop unscrupulous contractors, but the 
debarment regime is still unable to stop procurement fraud (Komolafe, 2018). For 
example, the City of Chicago recorded about 158 debarment actions between fiscal years 
2008 and 2019 due to several frauds committed by the City’s contractors (City of 
Chicago, 2020). It suffices to say that debarment at the federal or local government level 
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can only end a contractor’s business with the government but may not necessarily end 
public procurement frauds. The debarment sanction system has received a great deal of 
attention from public procurement scholars (Auriol & Søreide, 2017; Williams-Elegbe, 
2015), lawyers (Levy & Wagner, 2018; Yukins, 2013), policymakers (Cibinc & Nash, 
1986), government organizations (GAO, 2011; GSA, 2019) and international 
organizations (Transparency International 2014; The World Bank Group, 2016). Current 
research recognizes that debarment practices can effectively deter contractors from 
committing fraud (Cerrone, Hermstrüwer, & Robalo, 2018; Whisler & Churchill, 2017). 
Nevertheless, no research has specifically focused on the predictive applications of the 
debarment list; this is a gap in the literature on debarment practices. The debarment list is 
an essential list that government agencies must check before awarding contracts to 
contractors (FAR, 2014; 31 U.S.C. § 6101). What is unknown is whether the data in a 
debarment list have predictive capabilities; this was the focus of the study.  
In this study, I addressed the literature gap by presenting new knowledge about 
the important link between the predictive relevance of a debarment list and the 
effectiveness of debarment deterrence on government contractors. To achieve this goal, I 
analyzed the City of Chicago’s debarment data to produce predictive analytics. Public 
organizations need the capability to analyze exclusion records to make actionable 
predictions that can improve debarment practices (Wang, 2016). With the understanding 
of the literature gap on the predictive capability of an agency’s debarment list, I chose a 
quantitative approach to analyze the Debarred City of Chicago Firms and Individuals. 
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That is, the debarment list of the City of Chicago and show that statistical predictions are 
possible from a debarment list.  
Problem Statement 
The relationship between a contractor’s location, debarment fraud, the length of 
debarment, and business entity in a government debarment list is not clearly understood. 
Several studies have used different concepts or techniques to focus extensively on 
debarment practices as an emerging frontline tool to sanction public procurement fraud. 
Auriol and Søreide (2017) used theoretical economic analysis to predict the effect of 
deterrence on debarment. Cerrone et al. (2018) used game theory to conduct a study on 
debarment predictions for collusive biddings in public procurement. Wang (2016) used a 
combination of game theory, statistical methods, and support vector machine (SVM) to 
analyze historical fraudulent DOD contractors’ data in the Federal Procurement Data 
System to classify new data to detect procurement frauds. Gallego, Rivero, and Martinez 
(2018) utilized machine-learning techniques to predict contract inefficiency and 
malfeasance in Colombia’s e-procurement system. However, no author has specifically 
addressed how public agencies can use their debarment lists to make statistical 
predictions that may improve debarment practices. This literature gap is surprising 
because the debarment list is a well-sought list, which government agencies must 
maintain and check before awarding contracts to any contractor (FAR, 2014). What is 
less well known in this literature gap but crucial to understand, is that the data in a 
debarment list may have predictive capabilities.  
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The general problem is that despite maintaining a debarment list, government 
agencies continue to face the risks of contracting with fraudulent or criminal contractors 
(Auriol & Søreide, 2017; Guile, 2010; McCue, Prier, & Swanson, 2015; Rendon & 
Rendon, 2015; Tillipman, 2013). The specific problem is that public agencies are not 
analyzing their debarment data enough (GAO, 2005, 2011) to gather predictive and 
actionable statistical information to improve debarment practices (Søreide, Gröning, & 
Wandall, 2016). The magnitude of these problems is that public agencies merely maintain 
a debarment list to check for unqualified contractors and alert other agencies of 
contractors that are ineligible to do business with the government (ISDC, 2017). As a 
result, the debarment list is underutilized in many public agencies (Amey, 2013; 
Schooner, 2004) and thus needs greater attention (GAO, 2011). 
The critical gap in the current literature requires ample study on the debarment 
list; understanding how the relationship between a contractor’s location, debarment fraud, 
the length of debarment, and business entity in a government debarment list can offer 
statistical predictions in public procurement. The problematic dearth of studies on 
government agencies’ capacity to utilize a debarment list to make predictive analyses 
should not continue. It is essential to minimize or curb procurement frauds in the public 
sector; otherwise, as Tracy and White (2011) suggested, the funds agencies need to 
provide services to the people may be depleted by the costs of fraud. It has become 
imperative to conduct this quantitative study to analyze a government debarment list to 
determine statistical predictions, which government agencies may utilize to optimize their 
debarment practices and prevent public procurement fraud. 
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Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine the predictive relationship 
of the effects of contractor location, debarment fraud, and length of debarment on 
business entities listed in the debarment list that were debarred from receiving contract 
awards from a municipal government in the State of Illinois. The independent variables 
were contractor’s location with two location categories (Chicago and Other cities), 
debarment fraud with two fraud categories (procurement and nonprocurement), and the 
length of debarment. The dependent variable was busines entity with two business 
registration types (firm and individual). The study analyzed the City of Chicago’s 
debarment list to determine the statistical probability of firms or individuals that may be 
debarred from the array of contractors doing business with the City.  
Research Question and Hypotheses 
The research question for the study is as follows: What predictive relationship, if 
any, do the location of contractor, debarment fraud, and the length of debarment on 
business entities (firms or individuals) listed in the debarment list have as to whether they 
were debarred from receiving contract awards from the City of Chicago municipal 
government in the State of Illinois? 
Null hypothesis: The debarment fraud of a debarred contractor listed in the 
debarment list of the City of Chicago will not be a significant predictor of business entity 
when compared to the contractor’s location and the length of debarment.  
Ho: µLocation = µFraud = µLength. 
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Research hypothesis: The debarment fraud of a debarred contractor listed in the 
debarment list of the City of Chicago will significantly increase the ability to predict 
business entity when compared to the contractor’s location and the length of debarment.  
Ha: µLocation ≠ µFraud ≠µLength. 
Theoretical Foundation 
The theoretical foundation is the blueprint that serves as a guide, support, and 
structure of research (Grant & Osanloo, 2014). Deterrence theory is the theoretical 
foundation that guided this study. Modern deterrence theory was rooted in the earlier 
works of Beccaria’s (1986 [1764]) On Crimes and Punishment and Bentham’s (1988 
[1789]) The Principles of Morals and Legislation. Deterrence theory emphasizes the 
probability of a reduction or prevention of illegal or unethical acts through threats of legal 
sanctions or penalties (Nagin, 2013; Paternoster, 2010; Tomlinson, 2016). According to 
Tomlinson (2016), deterrence theory hinges on three assumptions: “clear message, 
perception of sanction, and rational decision” (p. 33). Extant studies showed that 
deterrence theory operates on three crucial tenets: certainty, celerity, and severity of 
punishment (Maxwell & Gray, 2007; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001; Paternoster, 2010). The 
rationale for the choice of deterrence theory is predicated on the assumption that 
debarment sanction is a deterrence-oriented program that may prevent fraudulent 
contractors from receiving government contracts (Roberts, 2010). Deterrence theory 




According to deterrence theory, debarment will exclude not presently responsible 
contractors from receiving contracts from the government (specific deterrence) and 
prevent would-be not presently responsible contractors from doing business with the 
government (general deterrence). When a contractor is debarred following a violation or 
crime that is certain, swift, and severe, a contractor is less likely to repeat the crime, and 
the message is sent to other contractors showing the consequences of the commission of 
the crime (Purpura, 2019). The study used these logical connections to basic deterrence 
theory to explain the role of debarment sanction as a deterrence-focused program in 
public contracting established by the government to protect itself from doing business 
with unscrupulous contractors. Specifically, in the study, I weaved the tenets of 
deterrence theory into the research design to explore the effects of the research variables 
on deterrence debarment action.  
Conceptual Framework 
The debarment deterrence model (DDM) is the conceptual framework I developed 
for the study. The model is a synthesis of the deterrence theory and debarment sanction 
concepts gathered from the literature review. The three elements in the model are: (a) the 
predictor variables, which are the length, fraud, and location; (b) debarment deterrence, 
which is the notion that the debarment list may provide enough deterrence to keep 
fraudulent contractors from engaging in business dealings with the government because 
this list is a source of a threat that may portend a significant reputational risk on other 
contractors (Peirone, 2018); and (c) the outcome variables, which are contractors who 
registered to do business with the City as firm or individual. This model was used in this 
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study to facilitate the understanding of the same variables in the debarment list, the 
deterrence theory, and the way the theory and debarment list was operationalized for 
predictive applications in this research. 
Nature of the Study 
The nature of this study is a nonexperimental quantitative method of secondary 
data analysis. The study’s focus was to analyze the archival data in the debarment list of 
the City of Chicago to provide statistical predictions that may help improve debarment 
practices in public procurement. The secondary data analysis was used to examine the 
predictor variables (i.e., contractor location, debarment fraud, and length of debarment). 
It was also used to assess the extent to which these three predictor variables individually 
and collectively predict the outcome variable (i.e., business entity). The choice of the 
analysis of archival data is consistent with the argument of Chidlow, Ghauri, Yeniyurt, 
and Cavusgil (2015), that archival data is suitable to investigate the relationship among 
variables. Scholars agreed that secondary data analysis is appropriate when the data 
consist of dependent and independent variables relevant to the research (MacInnes, 2017; 
Vartanian, 2011). Hence the research design of secondary data analysis best served this 
study. 
Quantitative research measure variables and test relationships between variables 
to reveal patterns that lend credence to existing theories (Leavy, 2017). The study’s 
research design aligned with deterrence theory as an analytical lens to explain the 
deterrence effect on the predictor variables in the public organization debarment process. 
Statistical predictions estimate functional relationships that can provide outputs to a set of 
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inputs (McNabb, 2018; Wu & Coggeshall, 2013). The predictors variables were required 
in this study to develop a model that could predict the most statistically probable 
outcomes. I used binomial logistic regression as the statistical tool to build predictive 
models as a function of predictors—to test the hypothesis and predict the answer to the 
study’s research question. Scholars have agreed that binomial logistic regression analysis 
is suitable to test, model, classify and predict events where the dependent variable is 
categorical, whereas the independent variables can either be categorical or continuous 
(Bryman & Bell, 2015; Frees, Derrig, & Meyers, 2014; Laerd Statistics, 2017, Osborne, 
2015). 
Definitions 
Administrative agreement: Agreement between an agency and a contractor to 
resolve a contractor’s present responsibility inquiry such that the terms and conditions of 
the agreement will adequately protect government business interests without the 
imposition of government debarment (Levy & Wagner, 2018).  
Business entity: A business entity is also referred to as a contractor in this study. 
A business entity is an individual or a firm registered to transact business with a 
government agency (FAR, 2014).  
City: A short term used to denote “The City of Chicago” (City of Chicago, 2020). 
Contractor: An individual or firm that has entered into an agreement to provide 
goods or services to a government agency (FAR, 2014).  
Debarred: A contractor that is excluded from doing business with or receiving 
government contracts is “debarred” (Levy & Wagner, 2018). 
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Debarment: A sanction imposed by a public entity to exclude nonresponsible 
contractors (firms and individuals) from participating in public procurements for a 
specified period (Cerrone et al., 2018; Shaw & Totman, 2015).  
Debarment fraud: A type of fraud that caused the debarment of a contractor who 
egregiously violated procurement rules (City of Chicago, 2020). 
Debarment list: The debarment list is a government repository that contains 
information about contractors that are determined to be ineligible to receive contracts 
from the government (Levy & Wagner, 2018). 
Discretionary debarment: The debarring officer of the debarring agency applies 
the agency’s discretions to determine whether the implementation of debarment measures 
is appropriate to disqualify contractors who have committed certain offenses (Williams-
Elegbe, 2012). 
Exclusion: A general term that expresses either suspension, disqualifications, 
blacklisting, or debarment of a contractor from government contracts (Williams-Elegbe, 
2017) 
Entity: An entity is a contractor that is either a person or organization who has a 
legal right to do business with the government (Federal Acquisition Institute, 2013). 
Exclusion parties list: A web-based online register of companies excluded from 
the United States government’s procurement and nonprocurement activities (GSA, 2019) 
Federal acquisition regulation: A body of regulations governing all contracting 




Not presently responsible: This term means that debarment is not intended as a 
punishment for past violations but relates directly and focuses only on the contractor’s 
current state (Robins & Baker, 2015). 
Rational decision: This means maximizing the satisfaction of the decider’s 
preferences (Kogelmann & Gaus, 2017). 
Statutory debarment: This is when government legislation or policy mandates 
outright disqualification of contractors convicted or found guilty of committing specified 
offenses; the debarring officer must implement this policy (Williams-Elegbe, 2012). 
Suspension: A suspension is a temporary remedy to disqualify a nonresponsible 
contractor from receiving federal contracts (GAO, 2012; Miller & Martin, 2006). 
Assumptions 
A central assumption in this study is the view that contractors should make 
rational decisions. They have perceptions of the consequences of committing fraud if 
they want to or continue to do business with the government. However, this assumption 
may not be realistic in all situations because contractors are human beings who are 
susceptible to erroneous perceptions. The predictive value of the rational choice 
assumption may be diminished when the contractors did not choose rationally. For 
example, a study by Chapman et al. (2010) reported that some offenders under the 
influence of drugs might not make rational choices.  
Rational decision is relevant to this study to understand some critical dynamics 
about debarment deterrence. In this study, I presumed that debarment actions can deter 
future violations to the extent that exclusion that is certain, swift, and severe would 
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outweigh the reward a contractor obtained from committing a crime. This assumption is 
consistent with the argument of Kogelmann and Gaus (2017) that rational choice of 
human actions is necessary to get “predictive leverage in some contexts” (p. 232). Also, I 
made the assumption in this study that the effective deterrence of a contractor is possible 
through a combination of a contractor’s actions and a debarment sanction system. In 
other words, the predictive advantage is that a contractor is assumed to make rational 
decisions to avoid being listed in the debarment list and thus deterred by debarment 
sanction.  
Scope and Delimitations 
Government debarment typically covers sanctions for both procurement and 
nonprocurement violations (2 CFR § 180.970 (a)). The scope of this study focused 
primarily on debarment for procurement fraud because the study is essentially germane to 
procurement in the public sector. Debarment fraud in this study is a dichotomous 
categorical variable (procurement fraud and nonprocurement fraud). I used my personal 
experience as a certified public procurement scholar-practitioner to analyze the City’s 
debarment list professionally to determine the debarment fraud that are either 
procurement related or nonprocurement related. Nonprocurement related fraud was coded 
as a lower numerical number. This coding method was appropriate to give a premium to 
procurement fraud, which I designed to predict in the study. 
The study was delimited to the research design of secondary data analysis of 
government contractors listed in the City of Chicago’s debarment list. Only secondary 
data was analyzed in this study. I did not design the study to survey opinions of debarred 
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contractors but to examine the debarred contractors’ data and explore alternative ways to 
utilize a debarment list in public procurement. Another delimitation of this study is the 
potential generalizability of how the study could use the City of Chicago, a municipal 
government, to generalize for other government levels. I used the data in the City of 
Chicago’s debarment list as a sample to generalize that the data in the debarment list of 
other agencies are similar. Also, this study represented a generalization by replicating the 
study’s results of predictive applications of the debarment list in a municipal government 
in other government jurisdictions. By making generalizations that explain how debarment 
concepts are interrelated in other government agencies, the study finds support from Yin 
(2016), who argued that it is possible to use a holistic and exhaustive analysis of a case 
study to generalize for other similar settings.  
Limitations 
One of the study’s limitations was that I did not have control on the debarment list 
as a researcher because the data in the debarment list was the outcome of the City of 
Chicago’s official decisions when the data was originally created. More importantly, the 
public gets to know about documented evidence of public procurement fraud only when 
the violating contractor is listed in the debarment list. Another limitation was that the 
City may not have established its debarment list for research purposes. I did not have to 
deal with the measures and recency of the City’s actions when I retrieved and analyzed 
this data. However, my research was an attempt to use the City of Chicago’s the 
debarment list to answer the research question of this study and demonstrate that the 
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ability to deter public procurement fraud may be subject to the predictive capability of a 
debarment list.  
Significance of the Study 
Public agencies maintain a debarment list, which debarment officials do not have 
time to analyze (POGO, 2002), especially for prediction purposes. This study was an 
attempt to fill the literature gap that has not addressed the predictive capabilities of the 
debarment list. Doing so, I explored how government agencies can analyze debarment 
data for predictive analytics that may improve debarment practices. The result of this 
study’s findings might provide broad social implications to enhance legislation and 
applicability to empower policymakers to formulate policies that can elucidate better use 
of the debarment list. The study could also improve public procurement effectiveness and 
efficiency for the public good and tackle social challenges like procurement fraud, waste, 
and abuse in public organizations. Statistical predictions from this study may provide 
government agencies a better understanding of how its current contractors may apply best 
business practices to conduct business with the government responsibly. The study will 
benefit procurement leadership in public organizations to have a straightforward way to 
make decisions on how to utilize the debarment list effectively. This study is unique and 
the first to lead to a direction to future scholarly research because it focused on how 
agencies can derive statistical predictions from a debarment list. It could offer insights 
into debarment regimes that may provide efficient and practical deterrent solutions strong 
enough to minimize public procurement on waste use of taxpayers’ dollars. The study’s 
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significance is consistent with GAO’s (2011) report, which showed that government 
oversight was needed to improve debarment practices. 
Summary and Transition 
This study examined the predictive capabilities of the debarment list of the City of 
Chicago. Chapter 1 provided an overview of the research problem the study sought to 
address and its contexts. It also established the need for the research and introduces the 
frame of reference that guides it, such as the background, purpose, and research question. 
The chapter included the theoretical and conceptual framework that guided the study and 
known scope, delimitation, and limitation of the study. I then presented the significance 
of the study to public policymakers and scholars as well as the study’s potential influence 
on social change in enhancing public procurement effectiveness and efficiency for the 
public good and tackling social challenges like procurement fraud, waste, and abuse in 
public organizations. 
In Chapter 2, the literature review, I utilize an integrative and historical literature 
review approach to discuss current studies on debarment practices that are specifically 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
The literature review for this research focused on studies that have been 
conducted relative to exclusion records and debarment practices in public procurement. 
This literature review aimed to integrate previous research outcomes related to specific 
issues on the debarment list pertinent to this research question: What predictive 
relationship, if any, do location of a contractor, debarment fraud, and the length of 
debarment on business entities on a debarment list have as to whether they were debarred 
from receiving contract awards from the City of Chicago municipal government in the 
State of Illinois? The approach to the literature review was both historical and integrative. 
The historical review approach examines the history of the evolution of concepts and 
issues in a research topic (American Educational Research Association, 2018). The 
review situated government debarment systems in historical contexts to frame an 
understanding of the problems in the evolution of the debarment list. The integrative 
review approach considers syntheses and critiques of a research topic (Fink, 2014; 
Torracro, 2016). I reviewed relevant literature on the debarment system to generate a new 
perspective on the predictive applications of the debarment list in scholarly research and 
to give direction for future research.  
Current research on debarment practices recognizes that the debarment sanction 
system can be used as an effective deterrent to contractors that are willing to receive 
contract awards from the government (Auriol & Søreide, 2017; Cerrone et al., 2018; 
Moran, Pope, & Doig, 2004; Whisler & Churchill, 2017; Williams-Elegbe, 2019). 
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However, it is a problem that government agencies are susceptible to procurement frauds 
despite debarment remedies (Rendon & Rendon, 2016; Auriol & Søreide, 2017). This 
study focused on the analysis of the debarment list of the City of Chicago. It examined 
the predictive relationship of the effects of contractor location, debarment fraud, and 
length of debarment on business entities that were debarred from doing business with the 
City. Doing business with fraudulent contractors could mean wasteful use of taxpayers’ 
dollars and losses for recipients of government program services (Brink, 2013; Tracy & 
White, 2011). The Department of Procurement Services at the City of Chicago needs 
predictive capabilities to support the City’s efforts to prevent or deter procurement fraud. 
After extensive searches in different databases, search results showed that the literature 
on debarment practices is vast, but there is no specific peer-reviewed literature on the 
debarment list. However, there are minimal government reports related to issues on the 
debarment list yet with no information on a debarment list’s predictive application. 
This chapter includes discussion of  (a) literature search strategy, (b) theoretical 
foundation – deterrence theory, (c) conceptual framework – debarment deterrence model, 
(d) debarment sanction system – definition, functions and effect of debarment list, 
evolution and history of debarment list in public contracting, and debarment regulation, 
(e) the City of Chicago debarment system, and (f) predictor and outcome variables -
location of contractor, debarment fraud and length of debarment, and firm and individual 
as outcome variables. I used deterrence theory to explain debarment sanctions and 
facilitate the discussion of the conceptual framework underpinning the predictor and 
outcome variables examined in this study.  
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Literature Search Strategy 
I conducted extensive literature searches on several peer-reviewed articles and 
journals, which I retrieved online from subject-specific databases. The sources were 
Business Source Complete, Emerald Insight, ABI/INFORM Collection, LegallTrac, 
NexisUNI, Criminal Justice Database, SocINDEX, Taylor and Francis Online, 
LexisNexis, Ovid Journals, and multidisciplinary databases like EBSCO, Thoreau, and 
Google Scholars. I searched ProQuest Central to retrieve dissertations and theses related 
to public procurement debarment. I also retrieved relevant information from several 
textbooks and government publications that focused on procurement frauds and 
debarment practices in the public sector. Key search terms included the following: 
debarment, debarment list, procurement integrity, contracting integrity, procurement 
blacklist, public procurement fraud, public contracting fraud, suspension, debarred, 
suspension and debarment, procurement fraud, contractors, contractors, suppliers, pubic 
funds, City of Chicago, exclusion records, procurement integrity, blacklist, deterrence, 
deterrence theory, predict, predictive, and prediction. The maximum search period was 
limited to studies published within the last 5 years. Unfortunately, after running several 
searches in different databases, including Walden University library staff-assisted 
searches, the search result revealed very few peer-reviewed literatures on the topic of the 
debarment list available in the databases. Therefore, researching beyond 5 years was 




I applied the deterrence theory to frame this study. Deterrence theory holds that a 
sanction will ensure compliance of laws and deter future criminal violations of laws 
(Beccaria, 1986 [1764]; Kennedy, 2009; Piquero, Paternoster, Pogarsky, & Loughran, 
2011). The rationale for the choice of deterrence theory was predicated on the assumption 
that debarment sanction is a deterrence-oriented program that may prevent fraudulent 
contractors from receiving government contracts (Roberts, 2010). I used deterrence 
theory to explain the role of debarment sanction as a deterrence-focused program 
established by the government in public contracting to protect itself from awarding 
contracts to unscrupulous contractors. As applied to this study, debarment presumed 
deterrence of future violations such that if the exclusion is certain, swift, and severe 
enough (Tomlinson, 2016), then the consequences of debarment action will outweigh the 
reward a contractor obtained from the crime commission (Auriol & Søreide, 2017). 
Origin of Deterrence Theory 
Contemporary deterrence theory originated from the earlier works of Beccaria’s 
(1986 [1764]) Essay on Crimes and Punishments and Bentham’s (1988 [1789]) An 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Tomlinson, 2016). Beccaria 
agued in his treatise that individuals will make decisions to pursue their desires and avoid 
pains and may even commit crimes unless deterred. He believed swift and certain 
punishment would likely prevent and control crimes. For laws to have deterrent value, 
Beccaria advocated for clearly written laws whose punishments should be commensurate 
with the crime committed and made known to the public so that people in the society 
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would understand the consequences of their behavior. Bentham thought that any 
individual could determine the utility of an action. He advocated that the law’s object is 
to promote societal happiness and lessen pain by “punishing and rewarding” (Bentham, 
1988, p.189). His idea led to a criminological assumption that people break the law 
because lawbreaking benefits outweigh the consequences or costs associated with being 
caught and convicted (Byrne, 2015; Pratt et al., 2006). The classical perspective of 
Bentham’s proposition suggests that an individual can commit a crime in any given 
situation. However, an individual can make a rational decision based on the analysis of 
the cost and benefits of his or her action (Byrne, 2015). At the instance of rational 
decision, the sanction for a crime is likely to deter a potential offender if that sanction 
surpasses the benefits of the crime. Such sanction must be certain and swift through the 
efficient legal or administrative system (Byrne, 2015). Bentham’s concept on rational 
decision-making on the benefits of crimes coupled with Beccaria’s principles on crimes 
and punishment, eventually formed what is now known as deterrence theory (Tomlinson, 
2016). Deterrence theory views “humans as rational and hedonistic” (Purpura, 2019, p. 
67). That is, deterrence theory suggests that if the punishment for crime is certain, swift, 
and severe, then an individual is likely not to repeat the crime. At the same time, society 
would have understood the consequences of committing a crime (Purpura, 2019). 
Deterrence theory is the foundation underlying criminal punishment in today’s criminal 
justice system (Tomlinson, 2016). 
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The Scope of Deterrence Theory 
The meaning of deterrence theory is wide in scope. A survey of literature on 
deterrence showed that many scholars have provided divergent empirical and theoretical 
interpretations to explain the deterrence theory. Paternoster (2010) described deterrence 
as the prospect of reducing or preventing illegal or unethical acts through threats of legal 
sanctions or penalties. Geis and Hailes (2016) described deterrence as having the 
propensity to cause “fear” and “denial” in the commission of a crime (p. 57). Nagin 
(2013) defined deterrence as “preventative effect of the threat of punishment” (p. 84), 
that is, “behavioral response to the perception of sanction threat” (Nagin 2013, p. 253). 
Elliot (2013) described deterrence as a process by which a threatened act is not 
committed due to deterrent punishment. These definitions point to a convergent meaning: 
an individual or a population experiences deterrence.  
Deterrence theory is contextualized as specific deterrence and general deterrence. 
On the one hand, the concept of specific deterrence postulates that an individual who 
commits a crime and is caught and punished will be deterred from future criminal activity 
due to the individual’s experience of punishment (Nagin, 2013; Tomlinson, 2016). On the 
other hand, the concept of general deterrence proposes that the general population will be 
deterred from offending due to their response to the threat of punishment. The population 
will become aware of others being apprehended and punished (Elliot, 2003; Nagin, 2013; 
Piquero et al., 2011). Some studies on classical deterrence theory, such as Bridges and 
Stone (1986) and Schneider and Ervin (1990), erroneously suggested that specific and 
general deterrence concepts have mutually exclusive occurrences. However, other studies 
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asserted that both specific and general deterrence are not exclusive but merely apply the 
same mechanism in different populations (Gibbs, 1968; Elliot, 2003; Maxwell & Gray, 
2007; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001). Specific deterrence concerns an offender who has been 
caught and who would be deterred from committing the same or similar crime due to 
experience of the punishment for the crime (Elliot, 2003). General deterrence concerns 
potential offenders who have not yet been caught but would be deterred by the threat of 
punishment (Elliot, 2003). 
Classical deterrence theory is open to reconceptualization (Tomlinson, 2016). For 
example, Stafford and Warr (1993) introduced punishment avoidance to reconceptualize 
deterrence theory to mean that an individual can experience both specific and general 
deterrence occurrences concurrently. Punishment avoidance means that an individual 
who commits a crime is not caught and escapes criminal justice punishment (Stafford & 
Warr, 1993). In this regard, a specific deterrence effect will include direct experience 
with punishment and punishment avoidance, while the general deterrence effect will 
include indirect experience with punishment and punishment avoidance (Stafford & 
Warr, 1993). The reconceptualized deterrence theory finds support in Paternoster and 
Piquero’s (1995) research that confirmed concurrent effects of specific and general 
deterrence in college students’ perception of punishments. Otherwise, deterrence theory 




Assumptions of Deterrence Theory 
According to Tomlinson (2016), deterrence theory hinges on three assumptions: 
“clear message, perception of sanction, and rational decision” (p. 33). A clear message is 
the relay of a crime’s consequence to a target group (Tomlinson, 2016). Perception of 
sanction refers to when a target group receives the message and perceives it as a threat 
(Tomlinson, 2016). Deterrence theory also assumes a rational decision on the effects of 
sanction for a crime over the benefits of the crime (Byrne, 2015). 
Tenets of Deterrence Theory 
Extant studies showed that deterrence theory operates on three crucial tenets: 
certainty, celerity, and severity of punishment (Maxwell & Gray, 2007; Nagin & 
Pogarsky, 2001; Paternoster, 2010). 
Certainty. The tenet of certainty refers to the level for which a prospective 
offender faces a high probability of being caught if the offender commits a crime 
(Tomlinson, 2016). An offender who perceives a very low probability of being caught 
will likely commit a crime. Different studies show different results for the certainty of 
punishment. Maxwell and Gray (2007) and Marlowe et al. (2005) showed that the 
certainty of punishment effect deterred probationers in a drug rehabilitation program. 
Matthews and Agnew (2008) argued that the certainty of punishment affects deterrence 
because an individual with high risk-sensitivity will not be likely to commit a crime. 
However, Kleck, Sever, Li, and Gertz (2005) showed that the certainty of sanction threats 
had little effect on recidivism. These mixed results in research literature show that 
classical deterrence theory applies only to a particular category of crimes (Geerken & 
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Gove, 1977; Silberman, 1976) and the conditions - individual differences and situational 
differences, under which sanctions affect compliance (Piquero et al., 2011). 
Celerity. The tenet of celerity relates to how quickly an offender receives 
punishment after being caught for committing a crime (Pratt & Turanovic, 2018). A study 
by Nagin and Pogarsky (2001) showed that variation in celerity did not predict offending. 
Any delay between the time the offense was committed, and when the offender is 
punished will decrease the sanction’s deterrent effect (Tomlinson, 2016). 
Severity. The tenet of severity refers to the degree of punishment that is 
corresponding to the type of crime committed by the offender (Nagin, 2013). The 
deterrent effect of this tenet suggests that very severe punishment for breaking the law 
can deter an individual from committing a crime. However, studies conducted on 
incarceration in the United States did not confirm this assumption to be true because 
incapacitation also has a cofounding effect on crime reduction rate (Kleck et al., 2005; 
Paternoster, 2010). Kovandzic et al. (2004) showed that deterrence-oriented sanctions 
such as three-strike legislation have an inverse effect on deterrence and may increase 
crime. 
There is a consensus among scholars that the certainty, celerity, and severity of 
punishment are the crucial tenets of deterrence theory that will deter an offender and a 
would-be offender from committing future crimes (Maxwell & Gray, 2007; Nagin & 
Pogarsky, 2001; Paternoster, 2010). However, studies conducted on these tenets showed 
mixed results on the effectiveness of deterrence theory (Braithwaite, 2018; Chalfin & 
McCrary, 2017; Purpura, 2019; Tomlinson, 2016). 
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The Empirical Deterrence Equation 
The classical deterrence theory equation can be explained by a simple model that 
encapsulates all the basic tenets and deterrence theory assumptions. Several studies 
support the logic behind the model that certainty of the punishment increases deterrence 
because the high probability of punishment determines the cost of crime commission 
(Nagin, 2013). The severity of the probable punishment correlates with the probability of 
a high cost of the crime (Crump, 2018). The celerity of punishment becomes valuable 
only if it facilitates the objective of severity and certainty of punishment (Crump, 2018). 
The following mathematical expression will represent deterrence: 
Proposition 1: Crime will be successful if and only if  
S x P x C > V………………………Assessment of success 
Proposition 2: Crime will fail if and only if  
S x P x C < V ……………………. Assessment of failure 
S = Severity of punishment, P = Probability (certainty) of punishment, C = 
Celerity of punishment and V = the value of committing crime 
Proposition 3: Deterrence of a rational offender is possible if and only if 
Assessment of Failure – Assessment of Success > 0 
Figure 1. The deterrence equation. 
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A rational offender will be deterred if and only if the assessment of failure on 
crime commission is higher than the assessment of the success of crime commission such 
that the value of the deterrence equation in Figure 1 is greater than zero. This is the 
equation of classical deterrence theory in its empirical form based on the assumptions 
discussed earlier in this study. Recall that deterrence theory assumes a contractor is 
rational; this assumption suggests that a rational contractor will be deterred if the 
evaluation of failure is higher than the evaluation of success. The most effective 
deterrence can happen when an individual perceives sanction threats and the probability 
of apprehension based on the individual’s decision-making (Tomlinson, 2016). In other 
words, if the punishment for the crime is not severe enough to discourage an offender 
from a crime commission, the offender will not be deterred from committing future 
crimes (Tomlinson, 2016). 
Application of Deterrence Theory 
The application of deterrence theory is noticeable in several policy studies. For 
example, The World Bank established its debarment sanction with a clear deterrence 
purpose to achieve procurement integrity (Fromageau & Chazournes, 2012; The World 
Bank, 2014). Fariello and Bo (2015) stated that about 93% of The World Bank’s 
sanctions were through debarment remedy. My review of literature also found that the 
application of deterrence theory has been tested to be useful in nuclear warfare through 
mutually assured destruction (Mearsheimer, 1985; O’Neil, 2011), antitrust sanctions in 
private corporations (Lande & Davis, 2011), speed limits in public road safety (Ritchey 
& Nicholson-Crotty, 2011), and increased policing enforcement (Nagin, 2013; Watson, 
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1986). These examples show that deterrence-based policies deter crime when there are 
sanctions that strengthen the would-be violator’s perception of certainty of being caught. 
Based on my extensive literature review, I found that a consensus on classical 
deterrence theory suggests that both the specific and general deterrence are dependent on 
how a criminal perceives the severity, certainty, and celerity of sanctions (Gibbs, 1968; 
Maxwell & Gray, 2007; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001). Although, there is evidence of 
neglected linkage in deterrence theory. Recent studies on deterrence theory have 
introduced certain reconceptualization such as punishment avoidance (Stafford & Warr, 
1993), deter-ability (Jacobs, 2010), defiance (Chambliss, 1967; Paternoster, 2010), and 
social context of individual decision-making (Pogarsky et al., 2004). In sum, scientific 
evidence showed that the deterrence effect on legal sanction is marginal (Tomlinson, 
2016), but it is difficult to precisely determine the strength of the deterrence effect of the 
criminal justice system (Paternoster, 2010). Goals set forth by deterrence theory prescribe 
that the certainty of an individual being caught is a more effective deterrent than 
punishment (Nagin, 2013). 
Rationale - The Link Between Deterrence Theory and Debarment Sanction 
As stated earlier in this chapter, recall that the celerity, certainty, and severity of 
punishment are the crucial tenets of deterrence theory that may deter a rational offender 
and a would-be rational offender from committing future crimes. Similarly, in the context 
of government contracting, the elements of debarment deterrence are the probability of 
catching a rational contractor for procurement violations (celerity), probability of 
debarment (certainty), and the probability of listing in debarment list (severity).  
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Studies showed that contractors might be deterred from committing procurement 
frauds if there is a high possibility of being caught (Auriol & Søreide, 2017), provided 
that the costs of fraudulent activity outweigh the benefit of the activity from the 
perspectives of the would-be offenders (Auriol, Hjelmeng, & Søreide, 2017), and are 
aware of the law of crimes and sentences by understanding the reaction of criminal 
justice system to a commission of crimes (Crump, 2018). Debarment is not a punishment 
(Tillipman, 2012); it is not to coerce or embarrass contractors, but it is a program that 
leads to swift and certain sanctions to offer deterrence to contractors (Levy & Wagner, 
2018).  
To deter would-be fraudulent contractors, the government needs an intervention 
strategy that establishes direct links between fraudulent behavior and consequences by 
imposing sanctions that include exclusion of ineligible contractors from receiving 
government contracts. Debarment sanction is a deterrence-oriented program established 
by the government to deter contractors from committing fraudulent acts against the 
government (Roberts, 2010). An effective government deterrence-oriented program 
should have the capacity to prevent, detect, and prosecute contracting misconduct (Auriol 
& Søreide, 2017). More scholars agreed that debarment action is a severe deterrence-
focused government action capable of protecting the government’s interest from 
awarding contracts to an unscrupulous contractor (Crump, 2018; Williams-Elegbe, 2019). 
Deterrence theory could explain how debarment deterrence can perform two roles 
for the government: Debarment as a deterrence program can deter contractors through 
fear of doing business with the government and denial of government contracts. 
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Debarment sanction may instill fear into contractors’ minds by using a debarment list to 
communicate the threat of being caught to the contractors and forces contractor willing to 
do business with the government to consider their credibility as business partners of the 
government. On the other hand, the deterrent effect of debarment provides government 
opportunities to deny contractors government contracts by preventing fraudulent 
contractors, protecting government interest, stopping fraud, and hindering contractors’ 
capability to commit fraud.  
Conceptual Framework 
The DDM (see Figure 2), which I deduced from the literature review, represents a 
synthesis of the deterrence theory and debarment sanction concept.  
 
Figure 2. The debarment deterrence model. 
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The model provided the overall framework for this research. I formulated the 
model by adapting Fawcett’s (1999) technique of “conceptual-theoretical-empirical [C-T-
E] formalization” (p. 31). I used the model as a “generative source of thinking” (Ravitch 
& Carl, 2016, p.34), to indicate the importance of what to be studied based on the 
research question and the significance of what the research aims to find (Yin, 2016).  
In the model, a debarment list is viewed as a deterrent instrument with predictive 
capabilities through debarment deterrence. By applying deterrence theory, debarment 
sanction will exclude ineligible contractors from receiving contracts from the government 
(specific deterrence). Deterrence can prevent would-be ineligible contractors from doing 
business with the government (general deterrence). Figure 2 illustrates the Debarment 
Deterrence Model, which I used in this study to answer the research question. This model 
consists of three domains - predictor variables, debarment deterrence, and predicted 
outcomes.  
Predictor Variables 
The predictor variables are the length, fraud, and location appearing in the Model. 
The direction of an arrow from each predictor variable indicates that the variable is in the 
debarment list. The precise relationship between the dimensions of the predictor variables 
is predictable (Fawcett, 1999).  
Debarment Deterrence 
Debarment deterrence is a phenomenon that assumes that a debarment list is a 
general deterrent resource or asset, which government contractors can perceive as a 
source of sanction threat, which can impact the present responsibility of the contractors. 
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This is because a debarred contractor’s information would be published in a debarment 
list for public viewing (DeVecchio & Engel, 1992). This assumption is consistent with 
the findings of Peirone (2018), who argued that the debarment list could drive other 
contractor’s behaviors and portends a “significant reputational risks on contractors” (p. 
24). As a result, under the classical deterrence theory, the assumption is that a debarment 
list should have a general deterrent effect on rational contractors willing to participate in 
government procurements. In other words, the debarment list relays a clear message of 
the consequence of fraudulent activities to contractors that are willing to make rational 
decisions to abstain or otherwise, from the commission of procurement frauds. In 
debarment deterrence concept, a debarment list may become more effective if it rests on 
the plateau of deterrence theory (see Figure 2). Therefore, a debarment list meets the 
assumptions for which classical deterrence theory will be useful.  
Outcome Variables 
The outcome variables in the model are Firm and Individual contractors, 
representing the outcome of debarment sanction. To explain the deterrent effect of 
debarment sanction and predictive application of debarment list based on classical 
deterrence theory, the arrows flying from the debarment list in Figure 2 indicate the 
magnitude of the unknown odds or probabilities of contractors, P(Firm) and 
P(Individual). Therefore, the proper alignment between predictor variables, debarment 
deterrence, and outcome variables is what led to the predictive capability of the 
debarment list. This study applied statistical techniques that calculated the contractors’ 
odds and probabilities that may be debarred from the City, as presented in Chapter 4.  
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Debarment Sanction System 
The debarment sanction system has received the attention of scholars such as 
Sope Williams-Elegbe and Tina Søreide. Both authors have conducted several scholarly 
works in the field of debarment practice. Also, government agencies like GAO and GSA 
have released several reports on the debarment system. Williams-Elegbe analyzed the 
debarment in World Bank-financed contracts (Williams, 2007), and provided a 
comparative evaluation of contractor debarments for corruption across some select 
countries (Williams-Elegbe, 2012). Also, the scholar reviewed public procurement 
reforms in Africa (2015), evaluated debarment in Africa (2016), and examined the 
implications of negotiated settlements in public procurement debarment (Williams-
Elegbe, 2019). Søreide provided compelling discourse on economic analysis of 
debarment (Auriol & Søreide, 2017), and debarment deterrence in corruption and anti-
corruption sanctions regime (Søreide, 2015). GAO reported extensively on debarment 
procedures (GAO, 1987), provided government agencies recommendations for data 
reporting improvements (GAO, 2005), attention and oversight (GAO, 2011) and 
suggested action needed to promote transparency (GAO, 2012).  
As an antecedent to debarment, extant studies showed that fraud exists in public 
procurement (Achua, 2011; Aremu, 2015; Beth, 2005; Clark, Coviello, Gauthier, & 
Shneyerov, 2018; Jenny, 2005; Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016; Schuchter & Levi, 
2016; Williams-Elegbe, 2016). Part of the reasons adduced to public procurement fraud is 
that public procurement is highly vulnerable to corrupt practices (Cerrone et al., 2018; 
Piper, 2017). This vulnerability is because procurement is primarily concerned with 
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planning and spending of vast sums of public money to buy goods and services 
(Independent Broad-based Anti-Corruption Commission, 2016; Piper, 2012). The 
vulnerability of public procurement to fraud is traceable to the major stakeholders in 
public procurement. On the one hand, studies showed that public procurement fraud 
involves contractors that perpetuate collusion, price-fixing, or uncompetitive practices to 
deny the government of value for money in the procurements of goods and services 
(Hudon & Garzón, 2016; Tanaka & Hayashi, 2016; Williams-Elegbe, 2019). On the other 
hand, other studies showed that public procurement fraud involves public officials who 
desire to gain inducements over monetary transactions by exercising improper discretions 
to favor preferred contractors (Graycar, 2019; Manning, 2005; Morgner & Chene, 2014). 
These studies altogether confirmed that the exchange of money between public 
procurement officials and private contractors is a valuable instrument that also makes 
public procurement susceptible to corruption (Graycar, 2019; IBAC; 2016). In this 
context, incentives appear to trigger collusion between government officials and private 
contractors push for benefits advantage and share gains - a phenomenon Rose-Ackerman 
and Palifka (2016) described as “grand procurement corruption” (p. 99). 
Evidently, from the preceding, government contractors’ fraudulent activities have 
necessitated the need to exclude contractors that are found to be nonresponsible from 
doing business with the government. A contractor that has been investigated and 
convicted of violating procurement laws or committing other offenses indicating an 
absence of business integrity or honesty is deemed to be a not presently responsible 
contractor (FAR, 2014). According to Section 9.407-2(c) of FAR, not presently 
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responsible is a hallmark of debarment; it positions debarment as an inquiry focused only 
on the current state of the contractor. 
Figure 3 illustrates the flow of major activities in a debarment sanction system. 
When a contractor is determined to be not presently responsible, an agency may impose 
debarment sanction on the contractor if the agency determines that such action is needed 
to protect the government’s interests, and eventually listing the debarred contractor in the 
debarment list (GSA, 2019). 
Figure 3. Debarment sanction system.  
The literature survey I conducted showed that debarment sanction had become a 
standard practice in many international public agencies and government agencies. For 
example, multinational development banks (MDBs) such as African Development Bank, 
Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Inter-
American Development Bank, and The World Bank keep debarment lists of unscrupulous 
individuals and companies as part of their debarment sanctions regime (Søreide et al., 
2016). Debarment actions taken by these banks are mutually enforceable (Levy & 
Wagner, 2018). In other words, a debarred contractor in one MDB may face debarment 
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for the same violation for the same misconduct by other MDBs parts (ABA, 2018). Any 
contractor debarred by one MDB may be debarred by the other MDB participating in the 
cross-debarment systems (Levy &Wagner, 2018). The World Bank approved the “Mutual 
Enforcement of Debarment Decisions” agreement with major regional MDBs in 2010 to 
prevent corruption and fraud in public procurement (Nesti, 2014).  
The United Nations (UN), through its Contractor Review Committee applies 
debarment procedures to protect its interests by ensuring it does business with responsible 
and competent contractors (UN Procurement Manual, 2020). Each UN organization uses 
debarment sanctions to protect the UN’s interests. Public procurement hinges on public 
funds’ expenditure and thus requires good governance (Shakya, 2015). Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] (2016) asserted that a keystone of 
good governance is the integrity that leads to public trust. The role of good governance in 
government procurement is to promote the rule of law and upholding principles of 
procurement such as value-for-money, transparency, anti-corruption, competition, 
efficiency, and due process (Beth, 2005; Cutler, 2018; OECD, 2005; Passas, 2007; Veiga, 
Schapper, Calvo-Gonzalez, & Berroa, 2011). For example, in Nigeria, the federal 
government enacted the Public Procurement Act in 2007 to ensure efficient and effective 
good governance in public procurement (Williams-Elegbe, 2015). The Nigerian 
government is set to improve values for its citizenry by buying goods and services based 
on best practice public procurement principles and procedures, which include a formal 
debarment sanction regime. Debarment sanction is a public procurement regulation the 
US government uses as the last resort to protect the government’s interests (ISDC, 2019). 
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Figure 4 summarizes the number of debarment actions by the U.S. government from 
2009 through 2017. The United States government has implemented 10,982 debarments 
between Fiscal Year 2009 and 2017 (ISDC, 2019).  
 
Figure 4. Bar chart for the U.S. debarments from 2009-2017. From “The Interagency 
Suspension and Debarment Committee Annual Report to Congress,” by U.S. Interagency 
Suspension and Debarment Committee, 2018 (https://www.acquisition.gov/sites/default 
/files/page_file_uploads/Control%20ISDC%20FY%202017%20Report_Final_07_31_20
18%20-2.pdf). In the public domain.  
Further literature review showed evidence of corruption in the form of fraud, 
waste, and abuse in the public procurement (OECD, 2016; Schooner, 2004; Shakya, 
2015). The prevalence of public procurement corruption compelled the government to 
mandate debarment as either an administrative or statutory remedy to prevent public 
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procurement corruption (Williams-Elegbe, 2019). Debarment remedies are consistent 
with other goals of public procurement regulations, like transparent public procurement 
procedures and sanctions, in the prevention of fraud, wastes, and abuse such that 
government supplies and contracts are awarded to only eligible contractors.  
There is a consensus among authors that a debarment sanction system is a useful 
tool for protecting the government from awarding contracts to fraudulent, unethical, and 
nonperforming contractors (Dubois, Swan, & Castellano, 2015; Shaw & Totman, 2015; 
Søreide, 2017; Williams-Elegbe, 2019). As such, any contractor listed in the debarment 
list is automatically disqualified from receiving contract awards from the government for 
a specified period. However, in certain limited instances, exclusion may not be automatic 
if there is a compelling need for an excluded contractor’s services or products, such as 
military supplies (GAO, 2005, 2012). 
Definition of Debarment List 
Many organizations, authors, and scholars have attempted to define or describe a 
debarment list in different terms. Debarment list, otherwise known as the Excluded 
Parties List System (EPLS), is an electronic register of companies excluded from the 
United States government’s procurement and nonprocurement activities (GSA, 2019). It 
is a government-wide compilation of contractors that are ineligible to receive contracts in 
federal procurement and nonprocurement programs (GSA, 2019). Manuel (2012) defined 
the debarment list as a list of excluded contractors, which “contracting officers must 
check before awarding a contract” (p. 2). Harker and Castellano (2017) described the 
debarment list as a list of companies excluded from government procurement activities. 
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The debarment list is a government repository containing information about contractors 
determined to be ineligible to receive contracts from the government (Levy & Wagner, 
2018). 
Furthermore, GAO (1987) described a government agency’s debarment list as a 
list of contractors that are excluded from doing business with a government agency. 
Some international organizations, such as Transparency International (2013), described 
the debarment list as a web-based “blacklisting register” (p. 1). The register is available 
online for the wider public to consult. MDBs such as The World Bank Group (2020) 
described the debarment list as a list of firms and individuals that cannot receive contract 
awards from the World Bank-financed contracts for a stipulated period. The World 
Bank’s fraud and corruption policy prescribe that firms that have violated the fraud and 
corruption provisions of the Clause 1.14 of The World Bank Procurement Guidelines or 
the Clause 1.12 of The World Bank Consultants Guidelines must be blacklisted (The 
World Bank Group, 2020). 
A debarment list typically contains information about contractors that are 
excluded on procurement grounds and nonprocurement grounds. So also, it contains 
information on contractors debarred under federal statues (statutory or mandatory 
debarment) or contractors debarred under FAR (discretionary or administrative 
debarment). According to GAO (1987), debarment list has two primary purposes: (a) to 
provide a single and comprehensive listing of contractors debarred by government 
agencies from receiving contracts, and (b) to inform agencies about government 
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debarment actions so that the agencies will ensure that they award contracts to only 
responsible contractors. 
Having reviewed extant literature on the debarment list, for this study, I will 
define a debarment list as a list that contains the names and other information about 
nonresponsible contractors excluded from receiving future government contracts due to 
prior violations of government laws or regulations and failure to perform under their 
contractual obligations. 
Functions of Debarment list 
• Transparency. A debarment list is a transparent product of a due process of 
debarment proceeding outcomes and their reasons (Dubois, Swan, & 
Castellano, 2015). 
• Public data. It provides data on procurement frauds, waste, and abuse risk 
patterns against present and future award of contracts. This data can be 
analyzed to make statistical predictions appropriate for resolving policy issues 
on the debarment regime.  
• Accountability. It underscores the importance of monitoring timelines of the 
debarment actions of an agency. Public and private organizations or 
individuals can gain insights into an agency’s accountability efforts to 
mitigate procurement frauds. 
• Tracking. Every potential contractor is vetted through a debarment list. A 
contractor listed in it would not be eligible to participate in business activities 
with government agencies and other public agencies. 
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• Deterrence. The debarment list makes information about punishment 
cognitively inexpensive. It increases the probability of being caught and thus 
serves as a deterrence to would-be procurement violators. 
Effect of Debarment List  
• Public listing. An agency posts the name and address of a debarred contractor, 
including information about the exclusion in a debarment list (FAR 9.404(b)), 
which may be published online for public viewing (Levy & Wagner, 2018). 
• Procurement activity. A debarred contractor is immediately prohibited from 
receiving contracts and subcontracts from the government agencies (FAR 
9.405(a) (Levy & Wagner, 2018). 
• Nonprocurement activity. A debarred contractor may be excluded from 
participating in government nonprocurement transactions such as loans, 
grants, subsidies, and cooperative agreements (ABA, 2018). 
• Contractor. An individual debarred will likely face unemployment with a 
federal government agency or will be unable to maintain or obtain a security 
clearance. Ineligibility to receive contracts from the government due to 
debarment action can have negative business consequences for the debarred 
corporation. Debarment may negatively impact the reputation of a corporation 
listed in the debarment list. Debarment action on an entity may be imputed to 




• Reciprocity (Cross debarment). Many state agencies have provisions for 
reciprocal debarment across other states and federal levels of government. In 
cross debarment practice, a local government may not award contracts to a 
contractor currently active in the state or federal debarment list (ABA, 2018). 
For example, Section V(i) of the City of Chicago Debarment Rules stipulates 
that the City may debar a contractor that is actively debarred by “any other 
government agency.” 
Evolution and History of Debarment List in Public Contracting 
The authority for debarment in government procurement in the United States 
evolved from the concept of responsibility (Gallagher, 1988; Gantt & Panzer, 1957; Levy 
& Wagner, 2018; Miller, 1955; Swan & Castellano, 2015). According to Manuel (2012), 
the federal government based its contracting practices on a concept of doing business 
with qualified “responsible bidders” (p. 1). The broad scope of the concept of 
responsibility in procurement implies that a contractor must be a responsible bidder to 
receive federal contracts (Gantt & Panzer, 1957; Levy & Wagner, 2018). This 
responsibility standard, which emerged as the process to enforce statutory social and 
economic policy, continues today, especially in public contract laws and regulations 
(ABA, 2018; Cibinic & Nash, 1986). Eventually, a debarment list evolved from the 
government debarment process. 
In the 1780s, debarment actions slowly became one of the major tools the U.S 
military departments utilized to ensure that the military awarded future contracts to only 
contractors that were sufficiently responsible for fulfilling statutory and contractual 
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obligations (Nagle, 1999). Historical records showed that Robert Morris, the 
Superintendent of Finance under the Continental Congress, introduced a methodological 
competitive contracting process to supply foods to the Continental Army in Philadelphia 
in 1781 (Nagle, 1999). This contracting process entailed advertising for contractors to 
submit bids, opening sealed bids on the scheduled date, and negotiating and accepting the 
best offers. The story is that Superintendent Morris used an appropriate methodology to 
select contractors that are “men of substance and talents” (Nagle, 1999, p. 50) to perform 
the excellent and reliable business of food supplies to the Continental Army. In today’s 
government, this criterion connotes the selection of competent contractors who possess a 
degree of “responsibility” (Nagle, 1999, p.50). During this period, no literature reported 
that the government kept records of contractors that were found to be irresponsible. 
In the 1880s, the U. S. government officially introduced legislation to back the 
responsible bidding concept in government procurement (Levy & Wagner, 2018). The 
United States Congress enacted the Act of July 5, 1884, which requires the executive 
branch to award contracts to the lowest “responsible” bidder and reject any other bids 
(Levy & Wagner, 2018). There was no practice of keeping an official list of contractors 
excluded from doing business with the government until after World War 1 in 1918 
(Gallagher, 1988). At this period, government contracting officers were probably advised 
by word of mouth on their contractors’ performance or reputation (Gallagher, 1988). 
In the 1920s, the concept of contractor’s responsibility gradually accelerated to an 
idea of debarment in government contracting (Horowitz, 1983). The Budget and 
Accounting Act of 1921 established the General Accounting Office (GAO), and in the 
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years that followed, the Comptroller General had relied on the use of contractor’s 
performance bond to compensate for the inadequate performance of a low bidder 
(Horowitz, 1983). However, the first published opinion on debarment emerged in 1928. 
The Comptroller General of GAO acknowledged that a performance bond was not 
enough to protect government and thus proposed debarment action in a written memo (7 
Comp. Gen, 1928) that:  
When the interests of the United States require the debarment of a bidder, no 
question will be raised by this office with respect thereto, provided the length of 
the time of debarment is definitely stated and not unreasonable, and the reasons 
for the debarment, with a statement of the specific instances of the bidder’s 
dereliction, are made of record and a copy thereof furnished the bidder and this 
office (pp. 547-548).  
The highlight of the 1920s is that it was the period where the word “debarment” 
was first mentioned in public contracting. 
In the 1930s, debarment action was expressly introduced into government 
contracting through several Congressional Acts to curtail contractors’ failure to meet 
specific statutory and economic requirements (Levy & Wagner, 2018). For example, the 
Buy American Act of 1933 was the first statute that contained an express debarment 
provision that requires contractors to use American-produced materials, for which a 
violation may result in a three-year debarment length from government contracts (41 
U.S.C. §§ 10a-10d). Other statutes that contained express debarment provisions are the 
amended David-Beacon Act of 1931, which requires construction contractors to pay their 
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workers prevailing wages as determined by the Secretary of Labor [(40 U.S.C. § 276a-
2(a)] and Walsh-Healey Public Contract Act of 1936, which mandates inclusion of 
specific stipulations in manufacturing and supply contracts that exceed $10,000 [(41 
U.S.C. § 35)]. The Walsh-Healey Public Contract Act directs the Comptroller General to 
compile names of persons or firms on a list and distribute it to all government agencies 
[(41 U.S.C. § 6504(a)]. These Acts prescribe that any contractor that violates the terms in 
the statutes may face a length of debarment spanning three years [(41 U.S.C. § 6504(b)]. 
This period became the first time an official debarment list was introduced into the 
debarment process in government contracting. 
In the 1940s, Congress continued its endorsement of federal contracting’s 
responsibility standard (Gallagher, 1988). The government mandated military and 
civilian agencies to specifically contract only with responsible bidders (Gallagher, 1988). 
The Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 stipulates “responsible” bidder provision. 
It established the Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR), which stipulates 
debarment procedures for military agencies. The Act initially provides that a contractor 
that violates the regulations is subject to a debarment length for a period up to 3 years or 
5 years, depending on the nature of the violation but later limited to 3 years for all 
violations (10 U.S.C. §§ 3202 et seq.) as administered by Department of Defense (DOD). 
Likewise, The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 stipulates 
debarment procedures for civilian agencies. The Act established the General Service 
Administration (GSA), which maintained “responsible” bidder provision in its 
regulations (40 U.S.C. §§ 471 et seq or 41 U.S.C. § 354). The Armed Services 
49 
 
Procurement Act of 1947 and The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 
1949 became the forerunners to standardized debarment regulations (Gallagher, 1988; 
Levy & Wagner, 2018). During this period, under ASPR, each military department 
maintained its own debarment list (34 C. F. R. § 400.303). For example, the Adjutant 
General of the U. S. Army maintained and published a confidential list of bidders to 
whom awards will not be made (U.S.C. 81.13(g)(4) sup.1941), pursuant to Army’s 
procurement authority. The United States Navy maintained a “List of Ineligible 
Contractors” (34 C.F.R. 31.133) Supp.1947). The U.S Air Force maintained a “List of 
Ineligible Contractors and Disqualified Bidders” (32. C. F. R. Ch. IV, Sec. 1000.303). In 
this period, the debarment list of one military service also applied to other military 
services [(32 C. F. R. §§1.604, 1.605-1 (1954)].  
In the 1950s, improvements on debarment regulations became a more visible 
priority of the government. A study conducted by Gantt and Panzer (1957) confirmed the 
problem of several debarment lists across different agencies. It recommended that a 
central list should be maintained by one agency on behalf of all federal government 
agencies. The Reorganization Act of 1949 became operational and implemented as a 
Reorganization Plan. GSA promulgated the Federal Procurement Regulations (FPR) in 
1959 with express debarment authority and superseded the then-existing GSA 
regulations. The GSA regulations prescribe that an executive agency’s debarment list 
should be made applicable to the other agencies (41 C.F.R. Secs. 1-1.601 to 1-1.608 
(1960), while it also served as a basis for debarment within DOD (32 C.F.R. sec. 
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400.604-1(c) (Supp. 1954). This was the period causes for debarment were officially 
enumerated in government debarment regulations. 
In the 1960s, there was an exponential growth in government contracting with 
concerns about fairness in the use of debarment actions (U.S. Department of Interior, n.d; 
Gantt & Panzer, 1963; Levy & Wagner, 2018). In 1962, the Administrative Conference 
of the United States (ACUS) extensively reviewed the debarment process, found 
procedural deficiencies, and made nine recommendations to make debarment more 
effective (Gantt & Panzer, 1963). Furthermore, the Contract Work Hours and Safety 
Standards Act 1962 contained statutory debarment authority to protect workers’ right to 
prevailing wages (40 U.S.C. 327). Some statues created by Congress that contained 
debarment provisions include the Clean Air Act of 1963 to regulate air pollution (42 
U.S.C. § 7606) and Service Contract Act of 1965, which governs wages working 
conditions on service contracts over $2,500 (41 U.S.C. §§ 351-358, 1984). In this period, 
a violation of these statutes by contractors may result in a three-year debarment from 
receiving government contracts. 
During the 1970s, many government agencies adopted their debarment 
procedures, which resulted in variations in procedural safeguards in debarment actions. 
Notably, in 1971, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) issued 
regulations that contained debarment procedures that applied to not only contractors but 
also to grantees (2 C.F.R. §12424). The Clean Water Act of 1972 also contained 
debarment regulations that stipulate the debarment of persons or firms found in violation 
of this Act (33 U.S.C. §1 1368). These variations necessitated the government efforts to 
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address fairness and due process in debarment processes. In 1972, the Commission on 
Government Procurement (COGP) recommended that the Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy (OFPP) should conduct an expert policy review of debarment proceedings (Nagle, 
1983). In 1974, GSA and DOD amended their existing debarment regulations to 
guarantee effective due process for evidentiary hearing from contractors who oppose 
their proposed debarment. This was the period COPG advised OFPP to propose policies 
to establish uniformity of procedure to limit the length of debarment to 3 years for all 
government agencies and publish a consolidated debarment list for all government 
agencies (40 Fed. Reg. 22,318-19). 
In the 1980s, the federal government faced increased political pressure to curb 
fraud, waste, and abuse in government contracting (Levy & Wagner, 2018). U.S 
Congress criticized some agencies, especially DOD, for lack of aggressiveness in using 
debarment remedies to protect government interest from dishonest contractors. For 
example, in 1981, the Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight of 
Government Management recommended that the federal government issue regulation for 
a government-wide suspension and debarment. In 1982, OFPP released a policy paper 
that established substantive guidelines for uniform government-wide debarment [(47 Fed. 
Reg. 28,854 (July 1, 1982)]. Upon implementation, any executive agency’s debarment 
actions were honored by all other agencies (GAO, 1987). GAO developed a Consolidated 
List of Suspended, Debarred, and Otherwise Ineligible Contractors (the Consolidated 
List) to compile and disseminate the Consolidated List to government agencies. In 1982, 
GSA began to publish the Consolidated List, which is distributed to federal agencies 
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every month. Based on the OFPP report, Congress enacted the Defense Acquisition Act 
(DAR) mandating military departments to honor debarments issued by federal agencies. 
In 1983, GSA began to issue a weekly supplement to the Consolidated List to 
improve reporting timelines (GAO, 1987). Eventually, in 1984, ASPR and FPR were 
unified and designated as the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), thus strengthening 
debarment authority (48 Federal Register 42,102, 42,142). In early 1984, GSA developed 
a computerized method of keeping the information on the Consolidated List, which was 
accessible only within GSA. In September 1986, GSA developed a short-term method 
that granted some agencies with on-line computer access to its weekly updates with a 
view to closing potential information loopholes (GAO, 1987). In 1986, the President’s 
Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management recommended the use of specific 
criteria (e.g., mitigating factors) needed for consideration to determine if a contractor is 
“presently responsible.” Also, in 1986, President Bush signed an Executive Order 12549, 
which created the Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee (ISDC), as an 
advisory body to discuss current suspension and debarment related issues and assist in 
developing unified Federal policy. The Packard Commission and ISDC recommendations 
provided policy background that reinvigorated the government debarment list. For 
example, in 1987, GSA implemented a government-wide access system for the 
Consolidated List and rebranded later as Excluded Parties List (EPLS System). In this 
period, improvements in the debarment list became consolidated in several agencies 
while Congress and many agencies devoted more attention to debarment regulations. 
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In the 1990s, there were issues about the deficiencies and loopholes in the 
management of the Consolidated List because GSA had some difficulty providing timely 
information about the list to government agencies. A report by GAO (1987) had found 
that some debarred contracts continued to receive contracts from the government contrary 
to the provisions of FAR. For example, some agencies’ contracting officers unknowingly 
awarded contracts to contractors that had been debarred by other agencies because the 
contracting officers did not receive timely monthly updates of the Consolidated List from 
GSA. On March 17, 1997, GSA made the Consolidated List from Federal Procurement 
and Non-procurement Programs available on the World Wide Web and accessible via the 
Internet, yet still continued to publish the monthly paper version of the list (GSA, 1997). 
In the 2000s, debarment regulations continued to expand in scope (Søreide, 
2015); thus, each agency managed its own debarment list. The debarment mechanism 
was strengthened and given more visibility because GSA launched the Excluded Parties 
Lists System (EPLS) in 2007 (Martin, 2019). EPLS, among other things, listed the firms 
or individuals debarred, suspended, proposed for debarment, or otherwise declared 
ineligible from participating in Federal procurement programs (GSA, 2019). In 2009, 
GAO evaluated EPLS and reported that some excluded parties on the EPLS were still 
receiving federal contracts.  
In the 2010s, debarment policy became more significant to Congress due to 
increases in federal spending on contracts and reports that showed agencies awarded 
contracts to excluded contractors (GAO, 2011; Lipowicz, 2009). The government stepped 
up the incremental improvements it had made on the debarment process in the previous 
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years to address various loopholes that had been discovered in the EPLS and to otherwise 
increase its efficiency and effectiveness. Based on GAO’s (2009) report, GSA 
determined that EPLS was inefficient to provide adequate search capabilities and 
launched a new system known as the System for Award Management (SAM) on May 29, 
2012 (Murray, 2019). SAM consolidated seven existing government systems into one 
entity: the Federal Procurement System (FPS) and the Catalog of Federal Domestic 
Assistance (CFDA), Central Contractor Registration (CCR), Federal Agency Regulation 
(FedReg), Online Representatives and Certification Application (ORCA) and the 
Excluded Parties List System (EPLS; GSA, 2012).  
At the beginning of the 2020s, GSA implemented several significant updates to 
SAM. GSA enhanced SAM with kick-out timer for better security and to deter fraud 
(SAM, 2020). Currently, if an authenticated user is inactive for 30 minutes, SAM will 
automatically log out the user. 
From the above historical background, government debarment list evolved from 
when contracting officer relied on the word of mouth to determine a presently responsible 
contractor or otherwise, through when not presently responsible contractors were listed 
on a piece of paper and to this current dispensation when not presently responsible 
contractors are listed electronically on a web-based platform (SAM). According to 
information published on GSA’s (2020) website, SAM is a “public-accessible web-based 
directory of individuals and organizations that are not permitted to receive federal 
contracts or assistance from the United States government.” The policy is that any 
company currently doing business or willing to do business with the U.S. government 
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must be sure not to enter SAM. Consistently, GSA introduces improvements to SAM to 
meet the demand of immediate debarment actions. SAM is the official federal 





Historical Landmarks in the Evolution of Debarment List 
Year Debarment event Debarment list 
1884  Act of July 5, 1884 requires the executive branch to award 
contracts to lowest responsible bidder and reject other bids 
Word of mouth 
1928 First published opinion on debarment by the Comptroller No official debarment list 
1933 Congress enacted Buy American Act. The first statute to 
contain express debarment provisions.  
No official debarment list 
1935 Congress enacted Davis-Bacon Act. It amended debarment  No official debarment list 
1936 Congress enacted the Walsh-Healey Public Contacts Act. 
Debarment mandated as a penalty for violating the Act. 
Yes. First time debarment list 
was introduced (paper-based) 
1947 Congress enacted the Armed Services Procurement Act 
whose regulations stipulate suspension and debarment 
Debarment list can be 
exchanged in the military 
1949 Congress enacted the Federal Property and Administrative 
Services Act. It maintained the “responsible” bidder clause 
Each agency maintained its 
own paper-based debarment list 
1959 GSA promulgated the Federal Procurement Regulations. It 
supersedes its regulations with express debarment authority 
Agencies must state causes for 
debarment in debarment list 
1962 The Administrative Conference of the United States 
(ACUS) reviewed debarment processes. 
Paper-based list 
1963 Congress enacted the Clean Air Act. It mandates debarment 
of persons found in violations of the Act 
Paper-based list 
1972 The Clean Water Act stipulates debarment of persons  Paper-based list 
1978 Armed Services Procurement Regulations renamed as the 
Defense Acquisition Regulation. Debarment retained 
Paper-based list 
1981 Senate sub-committee on Oversight of Government 
Management recommended national debarment regulations 
Paper-based list 
1982 Office of Federal Procurement Policy released a policy for 
substantive uniform government-wide debarment 
Consolidated List distributed to 
agencies 
1984 Debarment authority strengthened by the creation of the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
Consolidated List was 
computerized for GSA only 
1986 Intragency Suspension and Debarment Committee 
established to discuss agencies’ debarment issues  
GSA granted agencies limited 
access to Consolidated List  
1987 GSA implemented a government-wide Consolidated List Computerized list  
1997 GSA made Consolidated List available to the public on the 
Internet. Available for free viewing and download.  
First time Consolidated List 
became accessible online 
2007 Debarment gained more visibility because GSA launched 
the Excluded Parties Lists System (EPLS) 
Consolidated List replaced with 
EPLS  
2011 Congressional Committee on Debarment and GAO 
examined agency practices in debarment actions 
EPLS continued as Web-based 
list and accessible online 
2012 Seven procurement systems consolidated into one large 
system known as Systems for Award Management (SAM) 
EPLS replaced with SAM 
(Enhanced web-based list)  
2020 SAM enhanced with kick-out timer to deter fraud.  
It will time out if inactive for 30 minutes 
SAM currently has better 





According to FAR (2014), Part 9, Subpart 9.4, suspension and debarment 
programs are established to sanction firms or violators from obtaining contracts from the 
government. FAR provides government-wide policies on debarment sanction and allow 
agencies the flexibility to make specific debarment decisions. Studies showed that the 
federal government’s debarment program is also replicated and codified into laws at other 
levels of government (Williams-Elegbe, 2012). Levy and Wagner (2018) reported that 
states and many local governments, such as cities or counties, further adopted debarment 
laws and regulations that are based on ABA’s Model Procurement Codes. Although 
states and cities used their discretions to design debarment laws and regulations that suit 
their specific interests and needs, they conform to ABA’s Model or FAR (Levy & 
Wagner, 2018). A contractor certifies that it has not been excluded, debarred, or 
suspended from and is not, in any other way, ineligible to participate in any state or 
federal governmental program. 
The City of Chicago Debarment System 
The City of Chicago has formal procedures for debarring contractors that are 
based on criminal indictments or court convictions (City of Chicago, 2020). The City 
adopted federal debarment laws and regulations and ABA’s Model Procurement Code for 
State and Local Government. The City of Chicago maintains a list of Debarred Firms and 
Individuals (see Appendix), that is recorded. The list contains the various types of 
egregious offenses or violations attributed to the name of firms or individuals who are 
either suspended or debarred from doing business with the City under Section 1-23-020 
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of the Municipal Code. Under the Code, City’s Contracting Officers are required to check 
the City’s debarment list to ensure that debarred contractors are not awarded City 
contracts. In most situations, City officials are also required to check SAM before the 
award of contracts. Contractors willing to do business with the City are expected to attest 
to the State of Illinois-mandated debarment certification under 30 ILCS 500/50-10(e). 
Also, a contractor must certify that neither contractor nor any of contractor’s directors, 
employees, representatives, and subcontractors who may deliver supplies or provide 
services under City contract are presently debarred by the U.S. government or by any 
federal government agency (13 C.F.R. § 145). Under debarment rules, indicted firms or 
individuals are debarred from engaging in business activities with the government. At the 
federal government level, statutory debarment published in Federal Register is typically 
determined by a criminal proceeding conducted by a court of the United States (ABA, 
2018).  
The concept of the City’s debarment practices originated from the federal 
government. The City of Chicago Debarment first adopted its Debarment rules on 
December 14, 2005. The current Debarment Rules, which were last updated on March 
28, 2012 (as at the time of publishing this study) prescribe policies and procedures 
governing the debarment of contractors by the Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) under 
the authority of Chapter 2-92 of the Municipal Code of the City of Chicago and Chapter 
65 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes in general and under the authority of 65 ILCS 5/8-10-
11 and 8-10-16 (City of Chicago, 2020). Debarment is a determination by the CPO that a 
contractor or a person or entity is not responsible and is not eligible to enter into contracts 
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with the City (City of Chicago, 2020). As it is in the federal government, the City’s 
debarment’s goal is not to punish contractors, but to protect the City from unscrupulous 
prospective contractors. Debarment allows the City to ensure that it does business only 
with “responsible” contractors and subcontractors. Also, the City of Chicago procedures 
for debarment takes into cognizance essential due process safeguards of notice that allow 
contractors facing debarment action opportunity to present the matter in opposition (Levy 
& Wagner, 2018). A contractor may avoid City’s debarment action if the contractor can 
demonstrate to the City that the purported wrongdoing was an isolated instance and will 
likely not happen again. The City does not maintain a web-based database of excluded 
contractors but maintains a debarment list that is published online for easy public access.  
The City of Chicago’s Debarment List Features 
Section 1(b) of the City of Chicago Debarment Rules provides for the listing of 
debarred contractors known as “List of Debarred Firms and Individuals” (City of 
Chicago, 2020). The current list is a 12-page record of debarred contractors in PDF last 
updated by the City on May 1, 2019 and retrieved for analysis for this study on August 
13, 2020. For this study, the City’s List of Debarred Firms and Individuals will be 
referred to as the “Debarment List.” The City’s Debarment List consists of the following: 
Entity/individual. The name of the business organization being excluded from 
receiving contracts from the City. The name includes the type of business operated by the 
contractor and the contractor’s primary address. 
Debarment date. The official date the CPO determined a contractor to be 
nonresponsible and not eligible to receive future contracts from the City, either as a prime 
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contractor or subcontractor. The contractor’s debarment became active on this date. 
Length of debarment. The length identifies the specified period a contractor is 
debarred from doing business in the best interests of the City. The length of debarment 
under discretionary debarment depends on the facts and the circumstances of a given 
allegation (Levy & Wagner, 2018, p. 182), while the length of debarment under statutory 
debarment is dictated by law (FAR 9.406-4 (2). FAR 9.406-4(c) and allows agency 
officers to reduce the debarment period. For example, upon written request to the agency, 
a debarred contractor may have its “debarment length reversed or reduced provided there 
is a new material evidence or judgment reversal” (ABA, 2018, p.184-185). 
Reasons for debarment. The reasons for debarment are the City’s specific 
grounds for debarring a contractor due to serious violation that it affects the contractor’s 
present responsibility (City of Chicago, 2020). There must be a reason for debarment 
(Williams-Elegbe, 2016). The reasons for debarment such as conviction of or civil 
judgment for the commission of fraud or criminal offense relating to City contracts and 
other misconduct showing lack of honesty as enumerated in Section V of the City’s 
Debarment Rules. Also, under Section VI, Paragraph 6.01, the City enumerates a set of 
potential mitigating factors upon which the contractor has the burden of demonstration to 
satisfy the CPO that the debarment may not be required. 
The City of Chicago’s Debarment Procedures Leading to Debarment List 
The provision for debarment procedures as stipulated in Section VII of the City’s 
Debarment Rules. The City commences a debarment process when a contractor is 
convicted or alleged to have engaged in any of the violations enumerated in Section V of 
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the City’s Debarment Rules. (Section V[a-i]). The information is referred to as the CPO, 
who shall review the seriousness of the violation and decide to propose debarment and 
designate a Debarment Officer to coordinate the debarment process until completed 
(Section VI. Par. 6.01). The CPO shall issue Notice of Proposed Debarment (the 
“Notice”) to the contractor (Section VI. Par. 7.02). The Notice is to inform the contractor 
that debarment is being proposed, reasons for the proposed debarment stating that the 
contractor may submit written opposition to the proposed debarment within 30 days after 
receipt of the Notice, administrative contact and copy of City’s debarment’s rules 
(Section VII. Par 7.02[a]-[f]). At this stage, the contractor is still eligible to receive 
contracts from the City, but such a contract may be terminated if the contractor is later 
debarred (Section VII. Par. 7.04[a][2]). 
The existence of any of the enumerated causes for debarment does not necessarily 
mean that the suspected contractor should receive an automatic debarment sanction. The 
CPO has the discretion to determine if the cause(s) for debarment are less serious or 
sufficiently serious (Section VII. Par. 7.04[b]). On the one hand, if the CPO determines 
that the cause for debarment is less serious, the CPO may ask the contractor to provide 
Show Cause letter that may lead to an administrative settlement between the City and the 
contractor (See the definition of administrative settlement). On the other hand, if the 
causes for debarment are sufficiently serious, and the evidence supporting debarment is 
compelling, the CPO may decide to issue the contractor a restraining letter. The 
contractor has ten days after the Notice or ten days after the date of the letter of restraint, 
whichever is later, to contest the letter of restraint (Section VII. Par. 7.04[c]). At this 
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stage, the contractor is not eligible to receive new contracts from the City unless cleared 
in the debarment process. 
Within 30 days of receipt of the Notice, the contractor is expected to submit all 
supporting documents to a designated City Officer, containing all the facts and arguments 
upon which the contractor contests the proposed debarment. The contractor or City may 
require an in-person hearing to decide if debarment is necessary. Hearings shall be 
conducted with fairness and transparency (Section VII. Par. 7.04[h][3]). After review of 
all relevant facts and written records presented by the contractor, the CPO shall reach a 
determination to either grant the contractor’s opposition to the proposed debarment or 
summarily decline the contractor’s opposition to the proposed debarment. The CPO may 
grant administrative settlement to a contractor whose misconduct the CPO found to be 
improper but may not warrant full debarment (Section VII. Par. 8.04). However, the CPO 
shall issue a formal letter of debarment to a contractor whose opposition to proposed 
debarment is declined at the in-person hearing (Section IX, Par. 9.02). The CPO will 
conclude the debarment proceedings by listing the name of the debarred contractor in the 
City’s debarment list published in the City’s website (Section IX, Par. 9.04). Figure 5 
depicts the City’s debarment procedures. This figure does not include every possible 
scenario in the City’s debarment procedures but summarizes the main route through 
which a contractor is listed in the City’s Debarment List.  
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Figure 5. Flow chart for the City of Chicago’s debarment procedure. Constructed from information gathered 
from “Debarment Rules,”  by City of Chicago, 2020 




Predictor and Outcome Variables 
Predictor Variables 
The predictor variables in this study are the location of contractor, debarment 
fraud, and length of debarment. 
Location. This variable refers to the official place of business registration of 
contractors currently doing business with the City. All contractors are expected to furnish 
to the City their street address. Contracting with a contractor with only a post office 
address in the profile is a potential indicator of the procurement fraud flag (Caulfield, 
2014; Wight, 2012). 
Debarment fraud. Debarment fraud is an egregious fraud that an agency 
determines to cause exclusion of a contractor from doing business with the government in 
a specified period (FAR, 2014). For this research, the two significant categories of 
debarment fraud I identified in the literature are procurement fraud and nonprocurement 
fraud. 
Procurement fraud. Procurement fraud is misconduct that threatens the integrity 
of procurement (OECD, 2016). Several authors have identified different procurement 
fraud types that are perpetuated by contractors in public procurement (Caulfield, 2014; 
Miranzo, 2017; Randon & Randon, 2015). The World Bank categorized procurement 
misconduct subject to debarment into five categories viz corrupt, fraudulent, collusive, 
coercive, and obstructive practices (The World Bank, 2016). These types of procurement 
frauds are also evident in the City of Chicago Debarment List. I reviewed the City’s 
Debarment List by taking a cue from The World Bank’s approach to procurement 
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misconduct classification. I found that procurement frauds committed by debarred 
contractors are in five major categories as follows: 
Set-aside program frauds. The set-aside program is a procurement solicitation 
program that is exclusively reserved for small businesses and minority women 
(Stanberry, 2004). The City’s set-aside programs are Minority-owned Business 
Enterprise (“MBE”), Woman-owned Business Enterprise (“WBE”), Disadvantaged 
Business Enterprise (“DBE”), Business Enterprise owned by People with Disabilities 
(“BEPD”). These set-aside programs were established by the City to ensure that a fair 
proportion of the City’s contracts are awarded to small businesses and minority women. 
Section V(d) of the City Debarment Rules prescribes that “making or attempting, or 
causing to be made or attempting to cause to be made, any false, deceptive, or fraudulent 
material statement in any application to obtain, expand, or continue certification as an 
MBE/WBE/BEPD/DBE” is a ground for debarment. The City has debarred some 
contractors who deceptively or fraudulently classified themselves as “women-owned” to 
qualify for City’s set-aside contracts. For example, the City’s OIG Report (2020) found 
that a contractor knowingly used its company as a minority “pass-through” to gain City 
contracts. A review of the City’s Debarment List showed the City of Chicago debarred 35 
contractors for set-aside program frauds in the fiscal years under review in this study. 
Contract frauds. This type of fraud is a willful misrepresentation of contract 
proposals or performance committed by a contractor to deceive the City. Contract frauds 
span many fraudulent schemes such as bid-rigging, kickback, or contractor inducement of 
procurement personnel with bribes to seek illegal favors in contract awards or approval, 
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conflict of interest, defective quality and purchase order abuse (Rose-Ackerman & 
Palifka, 2016; Yang, 2016). The City of Chicago debarred 40 contractors for contract 
frauds in the fiscal years sampled in this study. 
Phony companies to solicit contracts. This type of fraud is a deliberate effort to 
establish fake companies to induce fraudulent payments from the City. Fictitious 
companies that do not provide goods and services may be entered into the database to 
siphon money from the City Treasury. The City of Chicago debarred 15 contractors for 
operating on phony companies in the fiscal years sampled in this study. 
Forgery or falsification of documents to seek contracts. This fraud is a willful 
submission of forged tax documents or false statements regarding a material element of 
certification to seek City contracts. The City of Chicago debarred 11 contractors for 
forgery in the fiscal years sampled in this study. 
Fraudulent invoices/voucher reimbursement claims. This type of fraud refers to 
knowing the submission of fake invoices or vouchers for goods or services not delivered. 
It also includes fraudulently inflating contract fee for fictitious claims. The City of 
Chicago debarred four contractors for contract invoicing in the fiscal years sampled in this 
study.  
Nonprocurement fraud. Under government Nonprocurement Rule (NCR), a 
nonprocurement is any transaction, which is not a procurement contract. Examples of 
nonprocurement transactions include but are not limited to grants, cooperative 
agreements, loans, scholarships, fellowships, contract assistance, loan guarantees, 
subsidies, insurances, payments for specified uses, and donation agreements [(2 CFR § 
67 
 
180.970 (a)]. The government expands its budget through nonprocurement programs and 
activities, which are to “provide socio-economic and other assistance to the American 
public” (Levy & Wagner, 2018, p. 32). The City of Chicago operates nonprocurement 
programs as a cornerstone of the City’s economic and social policy that supports its 
citizens and residents. Therefore, a City contractor determined to have violated the terms 
of these nonprocurement programs may be convicted for criminal or administrative fraud 
and face the City’s debarment action. The City of Chicago debarred 33 contractors for 
nonprocurement frauds in the fiscal years sampled in this study. 
Figure 6. Bar chart for types of fraud 
 Figure 6 is a bar chart illustrating the types of fraud I identified in the City’s 
debarment list. For clarity, I used the red bar to distinguish nonprocurement fraud from 
procurement frauds. 




























is debarred from receiving contracts from the government (Levy & Wagner, 2018). 
Manuel (2012) explained that the degree of a debarment’s cause would determine the 
length of debarment, which may exceed three years. However, heads of agencies have the 
prerogative to waive administrative exclusions if there are compelling reasons (Manuel, 
2012). The length of debarment will typically match the gravity of the cause (GAO, 
2012). Cerrone et al. (2018) found that the deterrent effect of debarment on contractor’s 
collusion increases with the length of debarment. The history or pattern of conduct of a 
contractor may be used to determine an appropriate length of debarment (City of 
Chicago, 2020). For example, the City typically classifies length of debarment as either 
permanent or lifetime. A contractor would receive permanent debarment if the City 
determines that the contractor willfully registered the company to commit specific or any 
procurement fraud, while lifetime debarment is for other violations. 
Outcome Variable  
An outcome variable is a dependent variable a researcher makes an attempt to 
explain or predict (Polit & Beck, 2018). The outcome variable in the study is the business 
entity. Debarment data from The World Bank (2019) report showed that 48 corporations 
and individuals were debarred in the fiscal year 2019. This variable is the form of a 
contractor’s business type, either a firm (corporation) or an individual (sole proprietor). 
Business entity. A prospective contractor is expected to register with an 
appropriate government agency, the type of business organization that meets its business 
needs and legal obligations. Contractors willing to do business as a legal business entity 
with the City must formally receive registration approval from the Illinois Secretary of 
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State government, Illinois Department of Revenue (IDOR). These contractors must 
register with the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to receive a Federal Tax 
Identification Number. That is, an Employer Identification Number (EIN) either as a firm 
or a sole proprietary. The business entities in this study are firm and individual. 
Firm. For this study, a firm is a business entity where two or more persons run a 
business together with mandated management and reporting obligations and in which the 
entity’s finances are separated from personal finances (Garner, 2004). A firm can be a 
Limited Partnership (LP), Limited Liability Partnership (LLP), Limited Liability 
Corporation (LLC), Corporation, or Not-for-Profit Corporation (NFP). 
Individual. Contractors who registered as a sole proprietorship can do business as 
an individual. A sole proprietorship is a business entity in which an individual owns all 
assets and liabilities and operates in a personal capacity (Garner, 2004). 
Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter, I presented the historical and integrative review of the literature on 
the evolution of the debarment list and the current use of the debarment list in public 
contracting. Specifically, I discussed the City of Chicago Debarment procedures and how 
the City’s contractors can be listed in the debarment list. There is a critical gap in the 
literature that requires ample study on debarment practices: understanding the linkage 
between the predictive relevance of a debarment list and the effectiveness of debarment 
deterrence on government contractors (ISDC, 2017). I chose the deterrence theory as a 
predictive theory to provide an organizing structure for the study’s framework. By 
considering literature consensus on classical deterrence theory, this study views 
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contractors as rational and that when debarred following a violation or crime that is 
certain, swift and severe, a contractor is less likely to repeat the crime and also the 
message is sent to other contractors showing the consequences of a commission of a 
crime (Purpura, 2019). A review of relevant literature confirmed that debarment sanction 
could provide enough deterrence to keep fraudulent contractors from doing business with 
the government (Cerrone et al.; 2018; Peirone, 2018). Although an extensive search of 
the literature did not reveal any model that investigated the predictive applications of the 
debarment list, however, I developed an original conceptual framework: The Debarment 
Deterrence Model. The C-T-E technique (Fawcett, 1999) was adapted to facilitate 
understanding of the same variables in the debarment list, the deterrence theory, and how 
the theory would be operationalized in this research. 
In Chapter 3, I use the model to examine how the relationship among location of 
contractor, debarment fraud and the length of debarment can explain and predict the 
deterrent effects of debarment sanction on contractors (firms and individuals) doing 
business with the City. This model is essential because this study utilized the City’s 
debarment list data to predict contractors’ fraud probabilities by focusing on variables 
that show a tendency towards procurement fraud—a way of demonstrating that the ability 
to deter public procurement fraud may be subject to the predictive capability of relevant 
fraud data in a debarment list. The study’s research design, methodology, data analysis 
plan, and threats to validity are discussed in Chapter 3 in greater detail.  
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
The research method in this chapter includes a description of the research design, 
rationale, philosophical assumption, population, sample, sampling procedures, source of 
data, data collection, and data analysis plan. The quantitative nonexperimental design I 
selected was appropriate because it enabled me to assess whether the independent 
variables of contractors listed in the debarment list can determine the statistical 
probability of contractors (firms or individuals) that may be debarred from the array of 
contractors doing business with the City. I also describe threats to validity, ethical 
procedures, and the summary of this chapter. 
Research Design and Rationale 
Research Design 
Research design is the specific plan researchers adopt to answer a research 
question and strategies to strengthen the integrity of a study (Polit & Beck, 2017). 
Research design describes how the research is structured to show how the alignment of 
major components of the research addresses the central research question. Trochim 
(2020) described research design as a “glue” that holds all the research elements together. 
According to Cooper and Schindler (2003), research design establishes the plan for data 
collection, measurement, and analysis.  
I chose a quantitative nonexperimental design to analyze secondary data to 
answer the research question of this study. Quantitative research involves the use of 
numerical or statistical data to explain, predict, investigate relationships, describe current 
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conditions, or examine possible impacts or influences on designated outcomes (Walden, 
n.d.). In this study, I looked for statistical probabilities. Hence, the use of a quantitative 
approach was consistent with the purpose of the study to investigate variables leading to 
“precise measurement and quantification” (Polit & Beck, 2017, p. 415).  
The three types of quantitative research design available to carry out this research 
were experimental, quasi-experimental, and nonexperimental (O’Sullivan, Rassel, Berner 
& Taliaferro, 2017). Experimental design allows a researcher to exercise control over all 
variables that may affect an experiment’s result. The classic experimental design applies 
a randomized posttest design to test an experimental group and a control group 
(O’Sullivan et al., 2017). I used nonprobability sampling in this study, which did not 
require an experimental group nor a control group. Therefore, experimental design was 
not relevant to this study. A quasi-experimental design is like a classical experiment 
except that the quasi-experiment subjects are chosen randomly by identifying a group of 
subjects comparable to the group involved in the test (O’Sullivan et al., 2017). In this 
study, I neither selected subjects randomly nor chose a comparison of two groups, so a 
quasi-experimental design that utilizes comparison group pretest and posttest design was 
not appropriate. I adopted a nonexperimental design for this study because, as Polit and 
Beck (2017) suggested, this design is most appropriate for research in which the 
“independent variables inherently cannot be manipulated” (p. 146). I did not manipulate 
the independent variables in this study. I designed the study to take a snapshot of the 
predictive application of a debarment list using a statistical analysis of data to answer a 
descriptive research question. This selection is consistent with Johnson’s (2014) 
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argument that a nonexperimental design does not require much control or intervention, 
and it is “perfectly fine to answer descriptive and normative questions” (p. 67). 
Moreover, the purpose statement and research question propounded in this study suggest 
the need for secondary data, so this study’s design included secondary data analysis. The 
goal of using secondary data analysis was to gain easy access to a reliable government 
debarment data that would otherwise take several months and several dollars to collect.  
Operationalization of constructs. I used the following specific variables from 
the City’s debarment list: 
Dependent variable. Business entity is the dependent variable in this study. It is 
the type of business organization operated by a contractor. It is a nominal dichotomous 
variable categorized as “firm” and “individual” for this study.  
Independent Variable 1. Location of contractor is one of the independent 
variables in this study. It is the City of business registration of a contractor. It is a 
nominal dichotomous variable categorized as “City of Chicago” and “other cities” for this 
study. 
Independent Variable 2. Debarment for fraud is also an independent variable in 
this study. It is a fraud committed by a contractor based on administrative decisions, 
convictions, or civil judgments. It is a nominal dichotomous variable categorized as 
“procurement fraud” and “nonprocurement fraud” for this study. 
Independent Variable 3. Length of Debarment is the third independent variable in 
this study. It is the exclusion period of a contractor from government business and a 
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continuous ratio variable measured in years. For this study, the length of debarment is the 
period between the date of debarment through the end of FY19. 
Philosophical Assumption 
Leavy (2017) suggested six philosophical worldviews that can be used to conduct 
public administration research as follows: post-positivism, constructivism, 
transformative, pragmatism, critical realism, and art-based intersubjective. Because this 
study’s research design was a quantitative approach, I took the stance of post-positivism 
as my philosophical belief to explain my chosen research approach. Post-positivism is a 
philosophical interpretative framework that underscores determining empirical 
observation and measurement and theory verification (Babbie, 2013; Creswell, 2016). As 
a post-positivist, I approached this research to identify the causes that influence outcomes 
by developing numeric measures of objective reality. Post-positivism recognizes the 
existence of an orderly reality that can be studied objectively (Polit & Beck, 2017). For 
this study, the objective reality is the City of Chicago’s Debarment List that currently 
exists. To overcome the philosophical paradigm’s constraints, using post-positivism as an 
interpretative framework for this study allowed me to avoid bias. At the same time, I 
applied flexible choice of methods to match the purpose of the study, the research design, 
and the needs of the setting population to conduct the research.  
Rationale 
The secondary data I analyzed were from the Debarment List of the City of 
Chicago, which is currently archived on the City’s website and publicly accessible online. 
The advantages of using secondary data are to permit a researcher to answer the research 
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questions in less time and with lower costs than when using other data collection methods 
like in-depth interviews, surveys, and observation (Nishishiba, 2014; Saunders, Lewis, & 
Thornhil, 2016). A significant disadvantage was that I did not have control over how to 
verify the quality and accuracy of the secondary data (see Nishishiba, 2014). This 
disadvantage implies that I analyzed a pre-existing data, which I did not collect. 
However, this disadvantage did not pose a serious concern for this study because it is 
unlikely for the City to publish names of debarred contractors in the City’s official 
Debarment List if these contractors were not actually sanctioned with debarment by the 
City. The City may not have established its Debarment List for research purposes; 
however, my research was an attempt to demonstrate that the ability to deter public 
procurement fraud may be subject to a debarment list’s predictive capability. I resolved 
that secondary data analysis would strengthen this study, whence the relationships among 
variables in previously unanalyzed sample may lead to findings that can advance research 
on the debarment list. Trzesniewski, Donnellan and Lucas (2011) argued that “archived 
data tend to have higher quality than could be obtained by individual researchers” (p. 4). 
The choice of an archived data for this study’s analysis finds support in the argument of 
these authors. All the relevant data suitable for analysis to answer this study’s research 
question are available in the City’s debarment list. Hence, the list is appropriate, valid, 
and reliable.  
In this study, I evaluated the individual and collective extent that the three 
predictor variables predict the outcome variable. In other words, I used the predictor 
variables to develop a statistical model to predict the outcome variables and assessed 
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which of the predictor variables contributes to statistical significance to the model. 
Adding another predictor variable to the model may improve model misfit (Osborne, 
2015). There was no model misfit during statistical analysis. Therefore, I did not use a 
confounder variable to influence substantial changes in the coefficients of other variable 
in this study.  
Methodology 
Population 
The target population is the entire statistical population under consideration in 
research (Nishishiba, 2014; Polit & Beck, 2017; Simon & Goes, 2013). The target 
population in this study was the debarred contractors in the City’s debarment list from FY 
2008 through FY 2019. It is not necessary to investigate all levels of the American 
government. Thus, I selected the City of Chicago’s municipal government as the 
sampling frame within the public sector. 
Sampling and Sampling Procedures 
Sampling is a process of selecting a subset of the population to represent the 
target population (Polit & Beck, 2017; Simon & Goes, 2013). The subset selected to 
participate in this study is known as a “sample” (Nishishiba, 2014, p. 74). This study’s 
nonprobability sampling plan was designed to yield a representative sample in which 
cases selected from the target population shared common characteristics (Patton, 2015). 
This plan was consistent with Johnson’s (2014) argument that sampling that is based on a 
researcher’s judgment using very precise criteria “makes sense” (p. 156). For the research 
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objective, research question, and design I chose for this study, the sampling plan included 
the following steps:  
1. identify the target population,  
2. state the eligibility criteria, and  
3. select the sample. (Nishishiba, 2014)  
I used this sampling plan to seek out the best sample size for the study that could 
produce the best data such that the research results were the direct results of the sampled 
size (McNabb, 2018; Patton, 2015).  
The sampling procedure involved cleansing the unit analysis of data in the 
sample. I removed contractors listed with incomplete information in their unit of analysis. 
For example, I removed contractors with no information about their location in the 
Debarment List or whose specific reason for debarment was not stated. MacInnes (2017), 
suggested that the subset in a unit analysis of the data should have similar characteristics 
to all other cases in the dataset. The cases I selected represented a specific information-
rich sample that could illuminate relevant group patterns. The idea was to make sure that 
I analyzed the City’s Debarment List with all the relevant data for each contractor in the 
sample. The sampling errors can be reduced if all the units selected already have known 
characteristics representing the study population (O’Sullivan et al., 2017). These authors 
also suggested that the calculation for sampling statistics does not apply to nonprobability 
samples. This study’s design was a nonexperimental design; therefore, the use of power 


















Busines entity  Entity Dependent Nominal Individual = 0 
Firm = 1 
Location of 
contractor 
Location Independent Nominal Other cities = 0 
Chicago = 1 
     
Debarment fraud Fraud Independent Nominal Nonprocurement = 0  
Procurement = 1 
     
Length of debarment Length Independent Continuous Not applicable 
 
Table 2 shows that the study’s data consist of one dependent variable that is 
dichotomous and measured on a nominal scale, two independent variables that are 
dichotomous and measured on a nominal scale, and one independent variable that is 
measured on a continuous scale. I coded these variables as 0 or 1, with 1 representing the 
occurrence of the event of interest and 0 representing the absence of the event of interest. 
Procedures for Data Collection  
The data collection for this research only included secondary data. The study’s 
primary source of data was the “PDF List of Debarred Firms and Individuals” of the City 
of Chicago (2020). I retrieved the City of Chicago’s Debarment List from the Internet. 
This list is a publicly accessible document available on the City’s website 
(https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/dps/DebarredFirms/DebarredList05262
020.pdf). I saved all document data retrieved online for the analysis in a folder in my 
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password-protected computer and secure online system, which only me had the access to. 
The storage was to increase the reliability of the data analysis and applicability of my 
findings, so that the evidence can be reviewed directly by future investigators, who may 
provide a substantial base for the assertions I made in this study. I did not need to seek 
permission from the City to access or obtain the Debarment List because the data I used 
for the study was already published for the public on City’s official website. I analyzed 
only data that is publicly accessible online. The Debarment List is a list of contractors the 
City has determined to be ineligible to receive contracts from or do business with the 
City, having followed the provisions for debarment procedures as stipulated in Section 
VII of the City’s Debarment Rules (see Figure 5). I resolved that the data were 
sufficiently reliable for the purpose of this study because it is a data inspired by real-life 
administrative decisions.  
The data collection period began in the middle of July 2020, shortly after I 
obtained Walden University Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval. I persistently 
spent one week searching the Internet for publicly published debarment lists that matched 
this research sampling threshold. I did Internet searches looking for debarment lists in all 
the fifty states in America. I searched up to 120 municipal or county governments, and 20 
federal agencies. I also searched for the debarment list of multinational organizations 
such as the World Bank and the UN. I selected the debarment list that I retrieved from the 
City of Chicago website because this list has the most comprehensive information 
relevant for this study. Some of the debarment lists I searched did not list the reasons for 
debarment. Knowing the reason(s) for debarment was crucial for me to objectively 
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analyze all relevant information and data I needed to statistically determine the 
magnitude of the unknown odds or probabilities of contractors – firms, and individuals 
(see the conceptual framework on page 33). Also, I noticed that some government entities 
listed few contractors in their debarment lists. A small sample size would be too small for 
this study. The strength of this research was enhanced by selecting the City of Chicago’s 
Debarment List because it has a considerable sample size and the most comprehensive 
information relevant to the study. Therefore, the City’s Debarment List has a high 
reputability; it is the official records of contractors sanctioned with debarment by the 
City. The Debarment List presents the best source of the dataset for this study. 
Data Analysis Plan 
I utilized the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS, Version 25) to 
conduct the data for analysis. The dataset that I had created in EXCEL Spreadsheet was 
downloaded into SPSS software. SPSS is very suitable to analyze the data because the 
software was designed to perform several statistical tests and analyses and present 
graphical illustrations (Suresh, 2015). I applied binomial logistic regression as the 
statistical tool to test the hypothesis and predict answer to the research question of this 
study. Binomial logistic regression provides models of the probability of an event 
occurring based on the values of the independent variables (Osborne, 2015) and gives 
estimates of the probability of an event to occur (Laerd Statistics, 2017). Logistic 
regression is used to classify observations by estimating the probability of an observation 
in a category (Warner, 2013). Also, I used binomial logistic regression to explore how 
well the independent variables predict a categorical outcome (Pedhazur, 1997; Warner, 
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2013). The length of debarment is a continuous variable, while all other variables chosen 
for the study from the City’s Debarment List are categorical variables, and they were 
coded in SPSS. This study’s objective was to explore the cumulative effect of all the 
predictor variables together on the odds and probability of the outcome variable being 
debarred. I assessed predictor variables individually and collectively, to check their 
statistically significant contributions to predicting the dependent variable. Data analyses 
included in the study were descriptive statistics, omnibus tests, model summary, and 
calculation of odds ratio. Odds ratios measure the direction and strength of an association 
(Simeon & Goes, 2013) and can be deduced from the logistic equation. I presented the 
relevant tables and charts to report the results of the data analysis. 
Logistic Regression Assumptions 
I ensured that this study met all the assumptions of logistic regression analysis 
based on my study design and measurements, the data fit the binomial logistic regression 
model. The assumptions are stated below: 
• The data has a binary dependent variable (Harrell, 2015). 
• The data has more than one independent variable measured at either a 
continuous or nominal scale (Harrell, 2015). 
• There is evidence of a dependence of observations among the data and the 
categories of the dependent variable, while the nominal independent variables 
are mutually exclusive and exhaustive (Harrell, 2015). 
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• There were 138 cases per independent variable, which are more than the 
recommended number of 50 cases per independent variables (Menard, 2010; 
Tabachnick, & Fidell, 2014). 
• The continuous predictor variable has a linear relationship with the logit 
transformation of the outcome. (Box & Tidwell, 1962; Laerd Statistics, 2017). 
In this study, the interaction between the length of debarment variable and its 
log odds was obtained through Bonferroni procedure to validate this 
assumption. 
• The study data did not show multicollinearity; that is, no independent 
variables that are highly correlated with each other (Osborne, 2015). 
• There were no significant outliers or highly influential points (Osborne, 2015). 
Threats to Validity 
Validity is the degree to which a measure evaluates what it purports to measure 
(Fink, 2014). I used the binomial logistic regression analysis as the statistical test for this 
study to evaluate the level to which the measure forecasts the dependent variable. The 
rationale to reduce the threats to the internal and external validity of data adequately was 
to ensure meaningful interpretation of data of this study. 
Internal Validity 
The potential threat to internal validity is the accuracy of statistical regression 
analysis. However, to reduce any threat to the internal validity of the test, I assessed the 
data and confirmed that it met all the assumptions of a binomial logistic regression to 
provide the answer to the research question. These assumptions included the assumptions 
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about independence of observations and inclusion of important covariables (Harrell, 
2015). The assumption of linearity presupposes a linear relationship between the 
continuous independent (length of debarment) and the logit transformation of the 
outcome. I validated the assumption of linearity by using Box and Tidwell Test (Box & 
Tidwell, 1962), and Benferonni procedure (Laerd Statistics, 2017). The assumption of 
goodness of model fit was validated by Hosmer and Lemeshow Test (Hosmer & 
Lemeshow, 1989).  
External Validity 
The potential threat to the external validity of data in the study is the reputability 
of the City’s Debarment List because I did not create the data and the City did not 
establish the list specifically for this study. However, this threat of internal validity posed 
no threat to this study because it is doubtful to have a contractor listed in a debarment list 
without due process and official sanction. The Debarment List is the official records of 
contractors sanctioned with debarment actions by the City pursuant to Section VII of the 
City’s Debarment Rules.  
Ethical Procedures 
I received approval from the Walden University IRB (Approval no. 07-10-20-
0228450) before collecting data for the study. The Debarment List is a public document, 
which the City published on the Internet for public information. The data in the 
Debarment List are neither anonymous nor confidential. The data I collected are from 
public records, which I used for research purposes only. The data do not contain sensitive 
personal information; ethical protections are not serious issues in this study. Therefore, I 
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did not need to seek permission from the City to gain access or to obtain the Debarment 
List because I analyzed only data that was already available to the public.  
Summary 
In this chapter, I presented the methods and design that I used to conduct the 
study as well as the target population and sampling for the study. I also presented how I 
analyzed the preexisting data that cover the City of Chicago’s debarment decisions during 
12 Fiscal Years (FY 08 through FY 19). The core of chapter 4 includes study’s research 
question, hypothesis, data collection and a detailed analysis of the findings, which was 




Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative secondary data analysis was to examine the 
predictive relationship of the effects of location of contractor, debarment fraud, and 
length of debarment on business entities (registered as firms or individuals) that were 
debarred from receiving contract awards from a municipal government in the State of 
Illinois. Using binomial logistic regression, I analyzed the Debarment List of the City of 
Chicago to determine the statistical odds and probability of contractors that may be 
debarred from the array of contractors doing business with the City. In this chapter, I 
provided the results of binomial logistic regression analysis of the secondary data from 
the City of Chicago’s Debarment List I used to test the hypothesis and answer the 
research question. I included tables and figures to illustrate the results. Tables and figures 
enhance data presentation (Dietz & Kalof, 2009; Durbin, 2014). I also provided details of 
descriptive and inferential statistics and a summary of findings in this chapter.  
Research Question and Hypotheses 
In this study, I addressed the following research question and hypotheses:  
What predictive relationship, if any, do a contractor’s location, debarment fraud, 
and the length of debarment on contractors listed in the debarment list have as to whether 
they were debarred from receiving contracts from the City of Chicago municipal 
government in the State of Illinois? 
Ho: The debarment fraud of a debarred contractor listed in the debarment list of 
the City of Chicago will not be a significant predictor of business entity when compared 
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to the contractor’s location and the length of debarment. Ho: µLocation = µFraud = 
µLength. 
Ha: The debarment fraud of a debarred contractor listed in the debarment list of 
the City of Chicago will significantly increase the ability to predict business entity when 
compared to the contractor’s location and the length of debarment. Ha: µLocation ≠ 
µFraud ≠ µLength. 
Data Collection 
The data I analyzed for this study, which were publicly accessible online, were 
preexisting and covered up-to-date City of Chicago’s debarment decisions compiled in 
the City’s official Debarment List, pursuant to Section VII of the City’s Debarment 
Rules. After I received IRB approval, I analyzed data for 12 fiscal years from the City of 
Chicago Debarment List of debarred contractors, which I downloaded from a publicly 
accessible document published on the City of Chicago’s website 
(https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/dps/DebarredFirms/DebarredList05262
020.pdf). I identified the total universe of the City’s 158 debarment actions for all fiscal 
years, but I selected the City’s debarment actions for fiscal years 2008 through 2019 for 
this study. Each fiscal year ran in a cycle from July 1 through June 30. For example, FY 
2019 was the period July 1, 2018 to June 30, 2019. I was inspired to select 12 fiscal years 
because the number “12” is the natural number of months in a year. The data were 
screened, cleansed, and transposed into a dataset spreadsheet before I exported it into 
SPSS v.25 for analysis. I coded the dichotomous variables of contractor’s location, 
debarment fraud, and business entity before I performed the data analysis. There were no 
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discrepancies in data collection from the plan presented in Chapter 3. The total number of 
debarred contractors extracted for this study was N = 138. 
Description of the Study Sample  
The debarment data analyzed for this study covered fiscal years 2008 through 
2019. The City took the highest debarment action in 2009 (n = 39) but no debarment 
action in 2017 (n = 0). The visual displays of the data are represented by frequency 
distribution in Table 3 and a bar chart in Figure 7. 
Table 3 
 





Percent Valid percent Cumulative percent 
2008 8 5.8 5.8 5.8 
2009 39 28.3 28.3 34.1 
2010 4 2.9 2.9 37.0 
2011 37 26.8 26.8 63.8 
2012 17 12.3 12.3 76.1 
2013 8 5.8 5.8 81.9 
2014 1 .7 .7 82.6 
2015 12 8.7 8.7 91.3 
2016 1 .7 .7 92.0 
2017 0 0 0 92.0 
2018 8 5.8 5.8 97.8 
2019 3 2.2 2.2 100.0 





Figure 7. Bar chart for the City of Chicago debarments (FY08 - FY19). 
Study Results 
Baseline Descriptive Statistics  
In this study, I examined the predictive capability of the location of contractor, 
debarment fraud, and length of debarment in the Debarment List of the City of Chicago 
on the functional outcome of the business entities registered to do business with the City, 
such as the probability of getting a business entity debarred. I generated descriptive 
statistics based on business entity, location of contractor, debarment fraud and length of 
debarment to show the characteristics of the debarred contractors, shown in Table 4. The 


























Descriptive Statistics for Business Entity, Location of Contractor, and Debarment Fraud 
Variable 
 




Business entity Individual 82 59.4 59.4 59.4 
 Firm 56 40.6 40.6 100.0 
      
Location Other cities 58 42.0 42.0 42.0 
 Chicago 80 58.0 58.0 100.0 
 
Debarment fraud Nonprocurement 
fraud 
33 23.9 23.9 23.9 
 Procurement 
fraud 
105 76.1 76.1 100.0 
 
Among the registered business entities, the City of Chicago debarred more 
individuals than firms. Eighty-two contractors who registered as individuals represented 
59.4% of contractors debarred by the City, whereas the City debarred 56 contractors who 
registered as firms (40.6%). The data showed that 52% (n = 80) of contractors are in the 
City of Chicago, whereas 42% (n = 42) are located outside the City of Chicago. A 
government debarment lists consists of contractors that are debarred for procurement 
fraud and nonprocurement fraud (Levy & Wagner, 2018). In this study, procurement-
related debarments are categorized as procurement frauds while those that are not 
procurement related are categorized as nonprocurement fraud. The City recorded 105 
(76.1%) procurement frauds and 33 (23.9%) nonprocurement frauds. Fraud in public 
procurement manifest in different forms (Caulfield, 2014). For this study, I identified five 
subcategories of procurement fraud in the City of Chicago’s debarment list and classified 
other debarments that are not procurement related as nonprocurement fraud. The total 
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nonprocurement debarments were n = 33. Table 5 indicates the descriptive statistics of 
type of frauds identified in the City’s debarment list. The mode is the case with the 
largest frequency or percentage in a distribution (Bryman & Bell, 2015; Warner, 2018). 
Contract fraud has the highest frequency of 40 and represents the mode in the 
distribution, and accounts for 29% of the sampled population. Meanwhile, invoicing 
fraud has the least count of 4, which is 2.9%. 
Table 5 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Type of Frauds 
Types of fraud Frequency 
 
Percent Valid percent Cumulative 
percent 
Contract  40 29.0 29.0 29.0 
Phony company 15 10.9 10.9 39.9 
Forgery 11 8.0 8.0 47.8 
Set-aside 35 25.4 25.4 73.2 
Invoicing 4 2.9 2.9 76.1 
Nonprocurement 33 23.9 23.9 100.0 
     
 
Inferential Statistics 
This study was about finding the associations and predictive measures of location 
of contractor, debarment fraud and length of debarment regarding debarred contractors. I 
utilized binomial logistic regression, α =.05 (two-tailed), to analyze the data having 
confirmed that the data in this study met all the assumptions associated with the use of 
logistic regression analysis (see Data Analysis Plan in Chapter 3). Logistic regression 
analysis was performed in SPSS to assess the significant predictors of the outcome 
variable (business entity) from theoretically based variables (location, fraud, and length) 
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obtained from the debarment list. The results of inferential statistics are presented in six 
steps below to address the hypothesis and the research question. 
Step 1. Data coding. SPSS calculated cases and apportioned coding to the 
variables. I began the analysis with an inspection of the data to check for any missing 
case. This was to ensure that the appropriate cases were reported. Table 6 shows that 
cases used in the analysis were N = 138. There was no missing case, suggesting that the 
data were suitable for analysis. 
Table 6 
 
Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted cases 
 
 N Present 
Selected cases Included in analysis 138 100.0 
 Missing cases 0 .0 
 Total 138 100.0 
Unselected cases  0 .0 
Total  138 100.0 
    
 
Table 7 displays the coding for the dependent variables. The internal SPSS coding 
for the variable Firm = 1 and Individual = 0. The main event predicted in this study was 
debarment for firm. Debarment for individual was used as the reference category. An 





Dependent Variables Codings  




Table 8 is for the Categorical Independent Variable Coding. It shows coding for 
the categorical variables and counts for analysis. The categories had good counts, a 
situation that is desirable for logistic regression (Osborne, 2015). In the row for 
debarment fraud, the number of occurrences (frequency) for procurement fraud category 
was n = 105 and coded = 1, whereas the frequency for nonprocurement fraud was n = 33 
and coded = 0. The parameter coding = 1 for the n = 80 contractors located in Chicago 
City, while the parament coding = 0 for n = 58 contractors that are located across other 
cities outside the City of Chicago. I interpreted values coded =1 in this study. 
Table 8 
 
Categories Variables Codings 
Original value  Frequency Parameter 
coding (1) 
Debarment fraud Nonprocurement fraud 33 .000 
 Procurement fraud 105 1.000 
    
Location Other cities 58 .000 
 Chicago 80 1.000 
    
 
Step 2. Baseline model analysis. SPSS calculated the baseline model analysis. 
Only the constant was added to the model without any predictor variable. Table 9 
displays the classification of the predictor variables with no predictor variable added to 
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the model. This baseline model suggests an overall “guess” of 59.4% (82/138) percentage 
to predict every case that a business entity registered as an individual will be debarred 







 Business entity Percentage correct 
 Individual Firm  
Step 0 Business entity Individual 82 0 100.0 
Firm 56 0 .0 
Overall percentage   59.4 
     
Constant is included in the model and the cut value is .500 
 
Table 10 is for Variables in the Equation, which SPSS calculated as “Block 0 
Model. This model analysis included only the constant (intercept). I used this baseline 
model to compare with another model when all the predictor variables were added (see 
Table 16).  
Table 10 
 





S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant -.381 .173 4.480 1 .028 .683 
        
 
The description of parts in Table 10 are below: 
B - means Beta, which is the estimated logit coefficient (Warner, 2013). 
S.E. - means standard error of the coefficient (Warner, 2013). 
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Wald - means the test statistic for each predictor variable in the model (Warner, 2013) 
df - means degrees of freedom, which is the number of independent values that a statistic 
is based and calculated as (N-1) (Frankfort-Nachmias & Leon-Guerrero, 2018). 
Sig. - means the significance level (p-value) of the coefficient (Laerd Statistics, 2017). 
Exp(B) - is the exponential of B, which represents the odds ratio of the independent 
variable (Laerd Statistics, 2017) 
Step 3. Model fit calculated. I used SPPS to calculate the overall statistical 
significance of the model to test the hypothesis. Table 11 displays the values for the 
Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients. SPSS calculated “Block 1 Model.” The Omnibus 
tests predict categories when not compared to independent variables and show how poor 
the model can predict the categorical outcomes. The corresponding “Sig.” value to 
consider for the Chi-Square of 17.263 with a degree of freedom of 3 is from the row 
described as “Model.” This model is a test of the hypotheses stated in Chapter 1. The 
result of this model test showed that the chi-square showed strong significance (Chi-
square = 17.263, df = 3, p <.001).  
All three independent variables collectively proved to be statistically significant to 
predict the outcome variable. Therefore, the null hypothesis is hereby rejected while I 





Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
  Chi-square df Wald 
Step 1 Step 17.263 3 .001 
 Block 17.263 3 .001 
 Model 17.263 3 .001 
 
Table 12 displays the goodness of fit test that indicates the adequacy of the model. 
How a logistic regression model tests whether the model is an adequate fit to the data 
(Hosmer, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013). The result of Hosmer and Lemeshow test is 
not statistically significant as p = 0.448 (> .05). This test result in an evidence that the 
model is not a poor fit. 
Table 12 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 7.857 8 .448 
 
Step 4. Valence explained. SPSS calculated the summary of how the variation in 
the dependent variable is explained by the model. Table 13 provides a summary of the 
index of goodness of fit that explains the magnitude of variation in the dependent 
variable. -2log likelihood statistic measures how poorly the model predicts outcomes 
(Osborne, 2015). A smaller value indicates a better model (Laerd Statistics, 2017). The 
R2 explains approximately how much variation in the outcome is explained by the model 
(Warner, 2013). Researchers have the option to select Cox & Snell R2 or Nagelkerke R2 
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to calculate the explained variation (Warner, 2013). However, I adopted the result of 
Nagelkerke R2 because it can calculate values up to 1 unlike Cox & Snell R2. The 
(pseudo-R2) suggests that this logistic regression model analysis explains roughly 15.9% 




Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 169.118 .118 .159 
 
The result of the Hosmer-Lemeshow test in Table 14 shows that the closer the 
coherence between the observed values and expected probabilities, the better the model 
fit (Frees et al., 2014). This model indicates that the model has a good fit. 
Table 14 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test Contingency Table 
 
Business entity = Individual Business entity = Firm 
Total Observed Expected Observed Expected 
1 12 12.552 2 1.448 14 
2 12 12.167 2 1.833 14 
3 12 9.349 2 4.651 14 
4 10 7.794 4 6.206 14 
5 4 6.068 7 4.932 11 
6 5 6.288 7 5.712 12 
7 7 6.684 7 7.316 14 
8 8 7.075 7 7.925 15 
9 7 6.580 7 7.420 14 




Step 5. Category prediction. SPSS calculated the category prediction with the 
correct classification from the predictor variables. Table 15 is a classification table with 
the predictor variables added to the model. The overall classification rate is now 62.3% 
compared to 59.4% in the null model in Table 9. The improvement indicates that the 
model has higher predictive strength.  
Table 15 
 








 Individual Firm  
Step 1 Business entity Individual 52 30 63.4 
Firm 22 34 60.7 
Overall percentage   62.3 
     
a. The cut value is .500 
 
This study used a logistic regression to build predictive models as a function of 
predictors. The results of characteristics calculated in Table 15 is explained below:  
Percentage accuracy in classification (PAC) = 62.3%. There is an improvement 
in the overall prediction of the dependent variable because independent variables were 
added to the model. 
Sensitivity is 60.71%. This is the percentage of occurrences (firms) correctly 
predicted and actually observed as firms. It means [34/ (22 + 34)] % = 60.71% of firms 
debarred were also predicted by the model to be contractors that registered as firms. 
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Specificity is 63.4%: This is the percentage of nonoccurrences (individuals) 
correctly predicted and actually observed as individuals. In this case, the model correctly 
predicted [(52/ (52 + 30)] % = 63.41% of contractors debarred were individuals. 
The false positive value rate is the percentage of predicted cases which were 
incorrectly classified as firms. SPSS calculated it as [100 x (30 ÷ (30 + 34)] = 46.88%. 
This is the percentage of predicted debarred firms which are incorrect but actually 
observed as individuals. 
The false negative rate is the percentage of cases which were incorrectly 
classified as individuals. SPSS calculated it as [100 x (22 ÷ (52 + 22)] = 29.73%. This is 
the percentage of predicted debarred individuals which are incorrect, but they were 
actually observed as firms. 
Step 6. Variables in equation. SPSS calculated the primary binomial logistic 
regression equation. Table 16 provides the summary of the main logistic regression 
model. The Business Entity group code = 1 for Firm, while the code = 0 for Individual. 
The “B” (Beta) coefficients are used to predict the probability of a business entity 
occurring. The Wald statistic tests statistical significance of each independent variable to 
the model and it is calculated under the “Sig” column. The only predictor variable that 
was significant in the model is debarment fraud at p = 0.001. That is, Wald = 11.408, p < 
.001 was a significant predictor of business entity debarment. The odds ratio for the 
predictor variables is indicated as Exp(B). According to Laerd Statistics (2017), odds 
ratio is the change in the odds of the even of interest for one-unit change in the 
independent variable. The odds ratios were calculated to determine the relative likelihood 
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of predictability for business entity debarment. It is the estimated change in odds of 
procurement fraud relative to nonprocurement along with a 95% confidence score for the 
odds ratio. The model showed that procurement fraud is 6.86 times more likely to cause 
debarment of a business entity registered as a firm than nonprocurement fraud (the 
study’s reference category). 
Table 16 
 
Variables in Equation for Model 




 Location(1) .345 .385 .805 1 .370  1.412 .664 3.002 
Fraud(1) 1.926 .570 11.408 1 .001 6.860 2.244 20.974 
Length .011 .073 .023 1 .879 1.011 .876 1.167 
Constant -2.256 .892 6.392 1 .011 .105   
Note. Debarment fraud is calculated for procurement fraud relative to nonprocurement 
fraud. 
 
Answer to the Research Question 
The research question aimed to examine the influence of the predictive effect of 
the predictor variables (location of contractor, debarment fraud, and length of debarment) 
on the debarment of a business entity at the City of Chicago. 
The research question for this study was this: What predictive relationship, if any, 
do a contractor’s location, debarment fraud, and the length of debarment on contractors 
listed in the debarment list have as to whether they were debarred from receiving contract 
awards from the City of Chicago municipal government in the State of Illinois? 
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The answer to the research question is expressed by the logistic regression 
equation. Mathematically, the equation of a multiple regression model to predict the 
value of outcome variable Y using predictor variables X1 to X3 is stated below: 
Υ = β0 + β1𝜒1 +  β2𝜒2 + β3𝜒3 + 𝑒 ………………………………………………….. (1) 
Where, Υ = Predicted probability of the main event, debarment of business entity (Firm) 
1-Υ = Predicted probability of other event, business entity (Individual) 
𝜒1 = Location of contractor (Chicago) 
𝜒2 = Debarment fraud (Procurement Fraud) 
𝜒3 = Length of debarment (Length) 
β0 = Intercept (Constant) 
β1 = Regression coefficient of 𝜒1 
β2 = Regression coefficient of 𝜒2 
β3 = Regression coefficient of 𝜒3 
e = Residual term 
The logit transformation gives the following equation: 
Logit (Υ) = ln (Odds) = 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃(𝑌)
1−𝑃(𝑌)
) = β0 + β1𝜒1 +  β2𝜒2 +  β3𝜒3 …..………….……. (2) 
P = probability of the event occurring, e.g. a Firm getting debarred 
Odds Prediction Equation = 
𝐸𝑥𝑝(β0+β1𝜒1+ β2𝜒2+ β3𝜒3)……………………………….………………………………..(3) 
Covert odds to probabilities as given below 
Probability function = P = 𝐸𝑥𝑝(β0+β1𝜒1+ β2𝜒2+ β3𝜒3) / [1 +𝐸𝑥𝑝(β0+β1𝜒1+ β2𝜒2+ β3𝜒3)] .…....(4)  
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Or written as 𝑃 = (
odds
1+odds
) ………………………………………………………… (5) 
0 < p < 1 
           From (1) above, the final logistic regression equation is given below: 
Logit (Firm) = ln (odds) = -2.256 + 0.345𝝌𝑳𝒐𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 + 1.926𝝌𝑭𝒓𝒂𝒖𝒅 + 0.011𝝌𝑳𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒕𝒉  
Assuming location of contractor = Chicago (coded as 1), debarment fraud = procurement 
fraud (coded as 1), and length of debarment = 1 year, the odds and probability for 
procurement fraud to trigger debarment of a firm are calculated below: 
a. Recall procurement fraud, coded as “1” to predict business entity (firm) 
Ln (Odds) = -2.256 + (0.345*1) + (1.926*1) + (0.011*1) + e = 0.026 
Odds (Firm) = Exp (0.026) = 1.03  






) = 0.507 = 50.74% 
b. Recall nonprocurement fraud, coded as “0” to predict business entity (firm) 
Ln (Odds) = -2.256 + (0.345*1) + (1.926*0) + (0.011*1) + 0 + e = -1.9 
Odds (Firm) = Exp (-1.9) = 0.1496 
Probability (Firm) = [0.1496/ (1 + 0.1496] = 0.13 = 13% 
𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑠.  𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) = 1.03/0.1496 = 6.86 
The odds and probability for procurement fraud to trigger debarment of an 
individual contractor are calculated below: 
c. Calculating for procurement fraud, coded as “1” to predict business entity 
(individual) 
Logit (Individual) = 1- Logit (Firm) = (1 - 0.026) = 0.974  
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Odds (Individual) = Exp (0.974) = 2.649 
Probability (Individual) = [(2.649/ (1+2.649)] = 0.726 = 72.60%  
d. Calculating for nonprocurement fraud, coded as “0” to predict business entity 
(individual) 
Logit (Individual) = 1- Logit (Firm) = (1 + 1.9) = 2.9 
Odds (Individual) = Exp (2.9) = 18.74 
Probability (Individual) = (18.74/ (1 + 18.74) = 0.9493 = 94.93% 
A binomial logistic regression analysis was performed to predict the effect of 
location of contractor, debarment fraud, and length of debarment on the business entities 
debarred from doing business with the City of Chicago. SPSS was used to perform data 
from 138 cases included in this analysis. The data analyzed covered debarment actions at 
the City of Chicago for twelve Fiscal Years from FY 08 to FY19. In the outcome 
variable, busines entity category, coding for the variable Firm =1 and Individual = 0. The 
predictors variables were also coded in the model: for the location of contractor category, 
coding for the variable Chicago =1 and Other city = 0, and for debarment fraud category, 
the variable procurement fraud = 1 and nonprocurement = 0. Box-Tidwell Test was used 
with a Bonferroni correction to show a statistical significance at p < .01 (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2014). This test assessed that the length of debarment was linearly related to the 
logit of the dependent variable. The Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of fit test showed 
an evidence of model fit (Hosmer, Lemeshow, 2000). The result of the binary logistic 
regression model analysis showed strong statistical significance, χ2(3) = 11.408, p < .001. 
Since the test for significance is at p < .05, debarment fraud was the only predictor 
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variable that was statistically significant (see Table 16). The Wald ratio for the other 
predictor variables - location of contractor (χ2(3) = 0.805, p < 0.370) and length of 
debarment (χ2(3) = 0.023, p < 0.879) did not add significantly to the model. The logistic 
regression model analysis explained approximately 15.9% (Nagelkerke R2) of the 
variation in the debarred business entities variable and correctly classified 62.3% of 
cases. Sensitivity was 60.71%, specificity was 63.41%, the positive predictive value was 
53.13%, and the negative predictive value was 70.27%. A procurement fraud had 6.86 
times higher odds to get firms debarred compared with a nonprocurement fraud.  
I established in this study that only debarment fraud contributed significantly to 
the model in Table 17. To determine the debarment fraud effects on the model, I ran a 
separate logistic regression specifically for all the fraud types in the variable of 
dichotomous debarment fraud and controlled for location of contractor and length of 
debarment. The fraud type variables are categorical, with six different frauds. The 
dummy code created in SPSS are: Phony company = 1, Forgery = 2, Set-aside = 3, 
Invoicing = 4, Nonprocurement = 5, while I selected Contract Fraud as the reference 
category. Table 18 is the logistic regression for fraud types. Contract fraud was chosen as 
the reference category because it is the type of fraud that recorded the highest debarment 
in the sample. The model showed that phony company, forgery, and nonprocurement 
frauds are significant. The fraud of using a phony company to do business with the City 






Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Business Entity debarred based on Location 
of Contractor, Debarment Fraud and Length of Debarment.  
 Variable B S.E. Wald df p 
Odds 
ratio 
95% C.I. for odds 
ratio 
Lower Upper 
 Location(1) .345 .385 .805 1 .370 1.412 .664 3.002 
Fraud(1) 1.926 .570 11.408 1 .001 6.860 2.244 20.974 
Length .011 .073 .023 1 .879 1.011 .876 1.167 
Constant -2.256 .892 6.392 1 .011 .105   
Note. Predicted probability is of Business Entity for Firm. Statistical significance 




Logistic Regression for Fraud Types 
    Variable B S.E. Wald df p 
Odds 
ratio 
   95% C.I. for  
Odds ratio 
Lower Upper 
 Location (1) .284 .432 .432 1 .511 1.328 .570 3.095 
Debarment Fraud   22.507 5 .000    
    Phony Company 3.058 1.122 7.426 1 .006 21.288 2.360 192.032 
    Forgery -2.213 1.103 4.026 1 .045 .109 .013 .950 
    Set-aside .154 .502 .094 1 .760 1.166 .436 3.116 
    Invoicing .162 1.083 .022 1 .881 1.176 .141 9.819 
    Nonprocurement -1.823 .628 8.429 1 .004 .162 .047 .553 
Length -.099 .084 1.387 1 .239 .905 .767 1.068 
Constant .505 .821 .378 1 .539 1.657   
Note. Types of Fraud are compared to Contract fraud (reference category).  
Dependent variable = Business Entity (Firm).  





In Chapter 4, I showed that by using binomial logistic regression analysis to 
analyze the data in the debarment list of the City of Chicago, the predictor variables of 
location of contractor, debarment fraud and length of debarment proved to be 
significantly effective predicting the likelihood of a business entity that may be debarred 
by the City. Table 11 confirmed there was a statistically significant association in the 
predictor variables used in the study, χ2(3) = 17.263, p < .001. I rejected the null 
hypothesis but accepted the research hypothesis. The debarment fraud was the only 
predictor variable that contributed to the significance in the model. I ran a separate 
logistic regression analysis to examine the effect of different debarment fraud types on 
business entity. The model showed that phony company, forgery and nonprocurement 
frauds are significant. The fraud of using a phony company to do business with the City 
is 21.3 times more likely to trigger the debarment of a firm when compared to contract 
fraud. In Chapter 5, the final chapter of this study, I discussed the interpretation of the 
findings, implications, and limitations of the study, and offered policy recommendations 




Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendation 
This study was set out to examine whether the data in the City of Chicago’s 
Debarment List can determine the statistical probability of business entities (firms or 
individuals) that may be debarred from government contracting in the City. This study 
was a nonexperimental quantitative method of secondary data analysis of the Debarment 
List of the City of Chicago. Based on the principles of deterrence theory, this study was a 
scholarly attempt to produce predictive analytics which public agencies may use to deter 
government contractors from committing frauds in public procurement. The result of the 
findings showed that there was a statistically significant association in the predictor 
variables used in the study. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
A binomial logistic regression analysis was performed to examine the effect of 
location of contractor, debarment fraud, and length of debarment on the likelihood of the 
business entity that may be debarred from receiving contract awards from the City of 
Chicago. The logistic regression equation showed the following probabilities: 
• A procurement fraud had a 50.74% probability to trigger debarment for a firm. 
• A procurement fraud was 1.03 times more likely to cause debarment for a 
firm. 
• A procurement fraud had a 72.60% probability to trigger debarment for an 
individual contractor. 




• A nonprocurement fraud is 0.15 times more likely to cause debarment for a 
firm. 
• A nonprocurement fraud has a probability of 94.93% to trigger debarment of 
an individual.  
• The odds of having a firm debarred are 6.86 times higher for procurement 
fraud that they are for nonprocurement fraud. 
• The fraud of using a phony company to do business with the City is 21.3 times 
more likely to trigger the debarment of a firm when compared to contract 
fraud. 
The binomial logistic regression model result in this study showed statistical 
significance, χ2(3) = 17.263, p < .001. As all other independent variables remain constant 
(see Table 17), the coefficients show the change in the log odds that occur for a one-unit 
change in an independent variable (Laerd Statistics, 2017). In the case of debarment 
fraud, the change in log odds for procurement fraud is 1.926. This value is the increase in 
log odds (as B is positive) for debarment fraud related to procurement. Among the three 
predictor variables, location (p = 0.370) and length (p = 0.879) did not add significantly 
to the model. Only the debarment fraud was statistically significant at p < .001 (see Table 
17). This result means that when controlled for location of contractor and the length of 
debarment, procurement fraud has a 50.7% probability of triggering debarment for a firm 
relative to nonprocurement fraud. Also, procurement fraud has a 72.60% probability of 
triggering debarment for an individual contractor relative to nonprocurement fraud. The 
interpretation of this result is that a business entity registered to do business with the City 
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as an individual was debarred for procurement fraud more than firms. The odds ratio, 
which SPSS calculated as the Exp(B) value, is 6.86 for procurement fraud (coded as “1” 
under the debarment fraud category). Taking the exponent of the log odds, indicated in the 
output as Exp(B), gives the odds ratio, which shows that a one unit increase in a procurement 
fraud case increases the odds of getting a firm debarred from City contracts by a 
multiplicative factor of 6.86 compared to a nonprocurement case. In other words, the odds 
suggest that if a contractor is chosen at random from the sample, a procurement fraud is 
6.86 more likely than a nonprocurement fraud to cause a firm to be debarred. The 
confidence interval suggests that the actual difference in odds of firm debarment for 
procurement fraud compared with nonprocurement fraud could be as low as 2.25 or as 
high as 20.95. In Table 18, the fraud of using a phony company to do business with the 
City is 21.3 times more likely to trigger debarment of a firm when compared to contract 
fraud. These statistical odds are noteworthy because the City debarred more business 
entities for contract fraud (n = 40) than other frauds in the sample under review. This 
result means that a business entity that uses a phony company to do business with the 
City is certainly a huge risk to its procurement interests. This model result confirms the 
City’s policy, which debars a business entity that registered with the City as a firm for a 
lifetime if it was determined that the firm has egregiously violated procurement rules 
(City of Chicago, 2020). A lifetime sanction means that the City will not allow a 
company debarred for lifetime to do business with the City in any circumstances. Overall, 
the results in this study are consistent with the findings of many scholars that government 
agencies continue to face the risks of contracting with fraudulent or criminal contractors 
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(Auriol & Søreide, 2017; McCue et al., 2015; Rendon & Rendon, 2015; Williams-
Elegbe, 2019). It was also confirmed by government agencies and multinational 
organizations (GAO, 2014; ISCD, 2018; OECD, 2016, The World Bank, 2019).  
Research Question and Deterrence Theory and Conceptual Framework 
The research question asked for the probability of a business entity that may be 
debarred from receiving contract awards from the City of Chicago based on the effect of 
contractor’s location, debarment fraud and the length of debarment. In Chapter 2, I 
postulated that, in government contracting, the element of debarment deterrence is the 
probability of catching a contractor for procurement violations (celerity), probability of 
debarment (certainty), and the probability of getting listed in the debarment list (severity). 
In accordance with deterrence theory, increasing the probability of being caught increases 
the certainty that a contractor will be debarred. It suffices to say that by keeping a 
debarment list of those debarred, a government can prevent or reduce the rate of 
procurement violations in its jurisdiction. The certainty of being debarred deters a 
rational contractor from violating procurement regulations than celerity (Auriol & 
Søreide, 2017). Severity in deterrence theory is the strength of a sanction that correlates 
with the probability of a high crime cost, which is akin to the debarment length in the 
debarment system. Studies on the severity of punishment from legal sanction show that 
short to moderate punishment is likely to produce more effective deterrence than longer 
punishment (Cerrone et al., 2018; Tanaka & Hayashi, 2016; Tomlinson, 2016). 
The evolution of my conceptual framework is displayed in Figure 8. The 
emergent probabilities have been added to establish how deterrence theory underpinning 
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debarment deterrence may impact contractor willingness to receive contracts from 
government agencies. The logistic regression model predicts the odds and probability that 
a case of a given debarment fraud will trigger a firm’s debarment in government 
contracting. Since debarment fraud was the only significant variable in the model and 
procurement fraud was the event of occurrence in the model, the results showed that 
procurement fraud has the odds of 1.03 or probability of 50.74% to cause the City to 
debar a business entity registered as a firm from doing procurement business with the 
City. Also, procurement fraud has the odds of 2.649 or probability of 72.60% to likely 
cause the City to debar a business entity registered as an individual contractor from doing 
procurement business with the City.  
Figure 8. The debarment deterrence model with probability values. 
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These probabilities suggest that procurement fraud has greater chances of 
triggering debarment of an individual contractor than a firm relative to nonprocurement 
fraud. The conceptual model highlights the probabilities of how procurement fraud can 
trigger the debarment of firms and individual contractors differently but equitably. It also 
gives an insight into how debarment deterrence of procurement fraud shows better impact 
on firms than individual contractors when compared with nonprocurement fraud. The 
probability of legal sanction deter fraud greater than the severity of legal sanction (Mann, 
Garcia-Rada, Hornuf, & Tafurt, 2016). Procurement fraud is 6.86 times more likely to 
cause a firm to be debarred than an individual contractor relative to nonprocurement 
fraud. Therefore, this study confirmed that deterrence theory can be used to show that the 
probability of reducing a procurement fraud in public procurement can be achieved 
through debarment sanction.  
Limitations of the Study 
I selected the debarment list of the City of Chicago for analysis because the City’s 
list has all the data relevant for this study. The limitation to the generalizability of this 
study is that a government agency that does not have the type of secondary data I used in 
this study may not adapt the design of this study to generalize from the study sample to a 
larger population. It is important to generalize research outcomes from a dataset to real-
world practice settings (Polit & Beck, 2017). Another limitation in this study was that the 
algorithms I built for the dataset that I used in this study were populated by my hand due 
to lack of automation. Although this was a major practical constraint during the study, I 
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applied a robust study design that did not allow for sampling deficiencies or data quality 
problems. 
Recommendations 
The results of this study provided support for the relationship between location of 
contractor, debarment fraud, length of debarment and business entity. A practical 
recommendation for practice is that public agencies will need to keep detailed data of all 
the variables used in this study to tap into the opportunity to statistically predict certain 
contractors that might be involved in different types of procurement fraud. A business 
entity registered as an individual faced more debarments for committing procurement 
fraud relative to a firm. One recommendation is for the Department of Procurement 
Services at the City of Chicago to develop an intelligent policy to scrutinize the 
responsiveness and responsibility of individual contractors. The City and other public 
agencies need predictive capabilities that may foster the clarity, accountability, and 
integrity of its debarment system, to act as the first defense barrier in the quest to prevent 
or deter procurement fraud. More academic studies with bigger sample size are 
worthwhile to evaluate the innovative idea of utilizing a debarment list to produce the 
most statistically probable outcomes. Also, there is a need to address the issues regarding 
the application of cognitive technology on the debarment list to produce statistical 
predictions. I populated the dataset used in this study by hand due to lack of automation. 
However, artificial intelligence (AI) can be used to perform these time-consuming and 
laborious tasks at a scale and cost that human beings could not possibly do. Scholars 
reported that AI application in procurement will be the next wave of cognitive technology 
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that will impact public procurement practices very soon (Muchhala, 2018; Schubmehl et 
al., 2018; Zagorin, 2017). Hence, further academic research is imperative to discover how 
to apply AI based on data mining, data modeling and machine learning to automate the 
debarment list dataset. The ensued predictive analytics should open the need for 
government agencies to apply digital transformations in debarment. Otherwise, 
government agencies may continue to operate with an inability to gather meaningful data 
from a debarment list to perform intelligent data analysis. 
Implications  
In this study, I framed public debarment fraud as an endemic social problem, 
which may not allow the society to function at an optimal level. Predictive applications of 
the debarment list imply that procurement in the public sector needs social change for 
fraud prevention, public advocacy, and management of public funds. First, this study’s 
predictive analytics may strengthen the use of debarment as statutory enforcement to 
prevent or curb public procurement frauds. Second, the results of predictive analytics in 
this study may empower public advocacy to illuminate the urgency for contractors and 
government agencies to mitigate the risks of procurement fraud and push to direct 
taxpayers’ money to what it is meant to fund: procurement of goods and services for the 
common good of the people. Third, the empirical representation of the relationship 
between all the predictor variables and outcome variable can be stated as follows: A 
business entity debarred in a government agency is a function of the location of the 
contractor, debarment fraud committed and the length of debarment sanction on the 
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contractor. Theoretically, a predictive mathematical model for this function can be 
represented as:  
Logit (Firm) = -2.256 + 0.345𝝌𝑳𝒐𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 + 1.926𝝌𝑭𝒓𝒂𝒖𝒅 + 0.011𝝌𝑳𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒕𝒉  
A summary implication of this study was supported by Vollmer and Machholz 
(2017). They conducted a survey of Chief Procurement Officers (CPOs) around the globe 
and reported that about 83% of procurement leaders who participated in the survey think 
AI will revolutionize public procurement practices in no distant future. Therefore, Chief 
Procurement Officers and policymakers may utilize the information from this study to 
reimagine public procurement with better debarment practices, purchasing decisions, and 
prudent public funds management. 
Conclusion 
I developed the conceptual framework, the DDM, for this study as well as coined 
the term “debarment deterrence” for this research. This study has contributed to the body 
of knowledge by using deterrence theory to explain debarment sanctions. It has facilitated 
the discussions on the conceptual framework underpinning the predictor and outcome 
variables examined in this study. To the best of my knowledge, this research is the first 
study to examine a government debarment list’s capability to produce statistical 
predictions. It has closed the literature gap by presenting a new knowledge about the 
critical link between a debarment list’s predictive relevance and the effectiveness of 
debarment deterrence on government contractors. The burden of procurement fraud in 
public procurement is still and important public policy issue across all the three levels of 
government (Williams-Elegbe, 2016). However, based on the deterrence theory, the study 
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showed that the ability to deter public procurement fraud might be subject to the 
predictive capability of relevant fraud data in a debarment list. Since a debarment action 
is not a punishment but a deterrence-oriented policy (Levy & Wagner, 2018; The World 
Bank, 2016), this study recommends the pathway for government organizations to 
consider data-driven practical deterrent solutions that may effectively prevent 
procurement fraud, waste and abuse.  
An adverse effect of fraudulent procurement practices is evident in the debarment 
sanctions on many unscrupulous contractors. The association of location of contractor, 
debarment fraud, and length of debarment can predict business entity that may be 
debarred from the City of Chicago and provide support for the research hypothesis. The 
logistic regression equation for this study predicts that the odds of getting a firm to be 
debarred are 6.86 times higher for procurement frauds than they are for nonprocurement 
frauds. Specifically, the model showed the following results: 50.7% procurement fraud 
will trigger debarment for a firm, 72.60% Procurement fraud will trigger debarment for 
an individual contractor, 13% of nonprocurement fraud will trigger debarment for a firm 
and 94.93% of nonprocurement fraud will trigger debarment of an individual contractor. 
Furthermore, a contractor using a phony company to do business with the City is 21.3 
times more likely to cause debarment of a firm relative to contract fraud. The statistical 
predictions should open the need to apply AI in debarment practices. ServiceNow (n. d.) 
found that 77% of government procurement managers expect AI deployment would 
reduce workload of complex public procurement tasks. As shown in this study, the use of 
the predictive applications of debarment list by government organizations should 
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predicate on the supposition that government contractors may not engage in best business 
practices to do business with the government responsibly. Predictive applications of 
debarment list can create the appropriate balance of risk between the government 
contractors and the agencies to mitigate fraud and avoid unnecessary expenditures of 
public funds. This statistical transformation may allow government agencies to plan for 
the most statistically probable outcomes with confidence scores based on information 
gathered from historical debarment data.  
Finally, the City of Chicago and other public agencies may use the information in 
this research as a reform guidepost that may elevate the debarment list’s predictive 
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James M. Duff 
135 Post Road 







Criminal convictions on various counts 
including fraud related to the MWBE 
program. 
 
William E. Stratton 
4923 S. Princeton Ave 







Criminal convictions on various counts 





325 N. County Line Road 







Criminal convictions on various counts 
including fraud related to the MWBE 
program. 
 






Company used by James M. Duff to commit 









Company used by James M. Duff to commit 
MWBE program fraud. 
 






Company used by James M. Duff to commit 
MWBE program fraud. 
 






Company used by James M. Duff to commit 













Company used by James M. Duff to commit 
MWBE program fraud. 
 
 





Company used by Martin McDonagh to 
commit fraud. 
 
Martin McDonagh 12/17/2008 Lifetime Criminal fraud conviction. 
 
 





Company used by Charles Romano and 
Richard Rylewicz to commit fraud. 
 
Charles Romano 
6952 North Oriole Ave. 









Criminal fraud conviction. 
 
Richard Rylewicz 
6732 West Cermak Rd. 























532 Lois Ct. 













Criminal fraud conviction. 
 
 









6951 S. Bell Ave. 

















Company used by Patricia Fasula to commit 
MWBE program fraud. 
 
Patricia Fasula 
3826 S. Lowe Ave. 









Falsified MWBE certification documents. 
 
 









2518 East Creekwood Ct. 





















8201 W. 118th St. 









Criminal fraud conviction. 
 
 





Company used by Michael Leyden and 
Timothy Schrader to commit fraud. 
 
Michael Leyden 
6604 N. Sioux Ave. 












6604 N. Sioux Ave. 






Criminal fraud conviction. 
 






Company used by Joseph Ignoffo to commit 
fraud. 
Joseph Ignoffo 
25390 Columbia Bay Dr. 





















9230 South Racine 












1232 E. Bemes Rd. 









Criminal fraud conviction. 
 
 









10436 South Maryland 



































Company used by Debra Coveliers and 
Richard Coveliers to commit fraud. 
 
Richard Coveliers 
5835 West Higgins 









Criminal fraud conviction. 
 
Debra Coveliers 
5835 West Higgins 









Criminal fraud conviction. 
 
 









2947 South Halsted St. 









Criminal fraud conviction. 
 
 





Company used by Vincent Hinton to commit 
MWBE program fraud. 
 
Vincent Hinton 
4707 West Erie 








Submitted fraudulant MBE certification 
documents. 
 
A. Affetto Trucking, Inc. 3/19/2009 Permanent Company used by Anthony Affetto to commit 
fraud. 
Anthony Affetto 
2143 N. Narragansett 









Criminal fraud conviction. 
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John J. Leahy 
26107 Oakcrest Ln. 









Criminal fraud conviction. 
 
Edward Wisniewski 
7118 W. Main St. 









Criminal fraud conviction. 
 
James H. Levin 
5440 Touhy Ave. 









Criminal fraud conviction. 
 
 









5701 S. Sayre Ave. 













2726 Moraine Valley Rd. 









Criminal fraud conviction. 
 







Criminal fraud conviction. 
 

















Criminal fraud conviction. 
 
Milton A. Curry 
6014 S. Racine Avenue 








Financial irregularities; refused to cooperate 




a/k/a Fannie Gasparik 
5924 West 107th Place 












Orchestrated scheme to defraud City. 
 
 
KAR-DON, Inc. d/b/a 
Arrow Lumber Company 
5820 S. Ashland Avenue 










Submitted fraudulent invoices to the City and 
delivered materials in amounts smaller than 
the invoiced amounts. 
 
 
Donald L. Beal 
5820 S. Ashland Avenue 







Submitted fraudulent invoices to the City and 
delivered materials in amounts smaller than 




6413 Foggy Hills Way 







Oversaw approval of additional work outside 
of the scope of contract and without City 
authorization for performance of extra work. 
 
 
Divine Enterprises, Inc. 
a/k/a Divine Equipment 
Leasing, Inc. 
25W705 Harrison 













































4500 S. Kolin Ave. 









Guilty Plea on criminal indictment for 
fraudulently claiming to be a legitimate 
M/WBE business and acting as a pass- 
through for other companies. 
 
Azteca Supply Co. 
4500 S. Kolin Ave. 







Fraudulently claimed to be a legitimate 
M/WBE business and acted as a pass- 
through for other companies. 
 
Polibio Cabrera 
1932 N. Tripp Ave., #1 







Made false statements to Inspector General’s 





1932 N. Tripp Ave., #1 







Performed construction work as unlicensed 
contractor; made false statements to 





2622 West Cermak 









Falsified invoices submitted to the City for 
payment; Fabricated false documentation to 
mislead auditors from Compliance. Directed 
a witness to lie to IGO investigators. 
 
 
Centro Familiar La Gran 
Esperanza f/k/a Great 
Hope Family Center 
2622 West Cermak 












Falsified a reimbursement voucher and 
submitted it to the City for payment; 
Fabricated false documentation to mislead 




3935 West Fullerton Ave. 









M/WBE program fraud. 
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Logan Square Pest 
Control 
3935 West Fullerton Ave. 












M/WBE program fraud. 
 
Rochelle Knox 
2733 Lake Park Drive 







Submitted false documents in connection 
with City contracts; Submitted fraudulent 
reimbursement claims to the City. 
 
Changing Patterns for 
Families, Inc. 
5912 S. State Street 










Submitted false documents in connection 
with City contracts; Submitted fraudulent 











Owner of Cornerstone Construction 






330 S. Naperville Road, 
Suite 401 
Wheaton, Illinois 60187 
2/7/2011 Permanent Engaged in MWBE Program Fraud. 
 
Danton Fielder 
139 West 107th Street 









Engaged in MWBE Program Fraud. 
 
D & S Midwest 
Construction 
139 West 107th Street 























Approved additional work outside of the 
scope of contract and without authorization 
from the City. 
 
Nat L. Hyman 
727 N. Meadow St. 









Failed to cooperate with IGO investigation. 
 
Doris Moran LaSilva 
1851 W. Grand Ave. 







Misrepresentations regarding Ms. LaSilva’s 




Lupita Contractors, Inc. 
1851 W. Grand Ave. 







Misrepresentations regarding Ms. LaSilva’s 




1316 N. Pulaski Road 









MWBE program fraud. 
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N & L Pest Control 
1316 N. Pulaski Road 









MWBE program fraud. 
 
Corren Evans 
3335 S. Cottage Grove 












5003 N. Ashland 
Unit 1 E 












Submitted false documents to the City. 
 
The Stuff Toy Childrens 
Museum 
5003 N. Ashland 
Unit 1 E 















Submitted false documents to the City. 
 
Barry L. Fischer, MD 
1530 N. Ashland 











Finis Collier, Jr. 
3309 W. Van Buren 







Fraudulently claimed to operate a legitimate 
M/WBE business and acted as a pass- 
through for another company. 
 
FCJ Real Estate 
Development Company, 
Inc. 
3309 W. Van Buren 













Fraudulently claimed to be a legitimate 
M/WBE business and acted as a pass- 
through for another company. 
 
Earlene Heyden 
2314 Windsor Lane 













Submitted false documents to the City. 
 
Yong S. Yang 
632 Executive Drive 








Workers compensation insurance fraud 




632 Executive Drive 











Workers compensation insurance fraud 
relating to City contracts. 
 
Jimmie Acevedo 
419 E. Clark Street 









M/WBE Program fraud. 
 
Anthony McMahon 
301 N. Prospect 













6090 N. Kirkwood 









False Statements. M/WBE program fraud. 
 
Kathleen McMahon 
301 N. Prospect 









False Statements. M/WBE program fraud. 
 
Nancy McMahon 
6090 N. Kirkwood 









False Statements. M/WBE program fraud. 
 
Windy City Electric 
Company 
7225 West Touhy 












False Statements. M/WBE program fraud. 
 
James J. McHale 
5400 N. Northwest 
Highway 















2652 N. Mango Ave. 









False Statements and Documents. 
 
Thomas Masen 
2755 Ginger Woods 
Drive 












M/WBE program fraud. 
Dr. George E. Smith 
11070 S. Western Ave. 









Debarment by another government agency. 
 
MPI, Inc. d/b/a 
Management Planning 
Institute, Inc. 
11070 S. Western Ave. 



















11070 S. Western Ave. 












Debarment by another government agency. 
 
Institute for Positive 
Child and Family 
Development, Inc. 
11070 S. Western Ave. 






















11070 S. Western Ave. 















Debarment by another government agency. 
 
DBCC Organization 
11070 S. Western Ave. 









Debarment by another government agency. 
 
Brian Mullins 
18462 Dixie Highway 









False Statements and Documents. 
 
Josip Beslic 3032 
S. Princeton Ave. 









False Statements and Documents. 
 
Anthony Blum 8023 
Nature Creek Court 









M/WBE program fraud. 
 
Loretta Dicke 10/20/2016 Lifetime M/WBE Program fraud. 
 
Leticia Davis 10/24/2017 24 months False Statement/Representation 
 
Norvetta Landon 
5621 S. Ashland Ave. 













5621 S. Ashland Ave. 












Failure to cooperate with IG 
 
South Chicago Chamber 
of Commerce 
8948 S. Commercial Ave. 















8948 S. Commercial Ave. 












221 North Washtenaw 














221 North Washtenaw 

























ML Group, LLC 
1507 E. 53rd Street 
Unit 807 






The Illinois Department of Transportation 
issued a Notice of Suspension and Interim 
Suspension of ML Group. 
 
 
LIST OF FIRMS AND INDIVIDUALS INELIGIBLE TO DO 
BUSINESS WITH THE CITY OF CHICAGO 
PURSUANT TO CHICAGO MUNICIPAL 
 
ENTITY/INDIVIDUAL DATE OF CONVICTION/ REASON 
 
Central Auto Body 
3548 W. North Avenue 




Owner of Central Auto Body pled guilty to, 
and was convicted of, charges involving 
fraud in relation to a City of Chicago contract. 
 
John Szybkowski 
3548 W. North Avenue 




Pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, 




1220 E. 75th 





Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation 
to a City of Chicago contract. 
 
Brunt Brothers Transfer 
1220 E. 75th 





Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation 






Pled guilty to charges involving fraud in 







Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation 
to a City of Chicago contract. 
 
Manu Shah 
1510 Midwest Club 




Pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, 
charges involving fraud in relation to a City of 
Chicago contract. 
 
Shah Engineering, Inc. 
1510 Midwest Club 




Pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, 
charges involving fraud in relation to a City of 
Chicago contract. 
 
Robert C. Blum 
3062 W. 167th Street 




Pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, 







3062 W. 167th Street 






Pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, 









Pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, 




ICS Cable, Inc. 
 
4/29/2011 
Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation 
to a City of Chicago contract. 
 
Guy Potter 
459 McCracken Pike 





Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation 
to a City of Chicago contract. 
 
Jerone Brown 
5012 W. Gladys Ave. 





Pleaded guilty to charges involving fraud in 
relation to a City of Chicago contract. 
 
Matthew Giovenco 
844 Fieldale Lane 





Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation 
to a City of Chicago contract. 
 
Cheronne Mayes 
5012 W. Gladys Ave. 





Pleaded guilty to charges involving fraud in 
relation to a City of Chicago contract. 
 
C.M.M. Cable Co., Inc. 
5012 W. Gladys Ave. 




Controlling Person, Cheronne Mayes, 
pleaded guilty to charges involving fraud in 
relation to a City of Chicago contract. 
 
Wafeek Aiyash 
3756 Monarch Circle 




Pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, 
charges involving bribery in relation to a City 




5121 N. Marmora Avenue 




Admitted to accepting money to influence his 




10924 W. 167th Street 





Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation 




10924 W. 167th Street 







Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation 




Accurate Steel Installers, 
Inc. 
14631 S. New Avenue 







Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation 
to a City of Chicago contract. 
 
Anthony Cappello 






Pleaded guilty to charges involving fraud in 




11800 S. Ewing Ave. 







Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation 
to a City of Chicago contract. 
 
The Stealth Group a/k/a 
SGI, Inc. 
11800 S. Ewing Ave. 







Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation 
to a City of Chicago contract. 
 
David Johnson 4/11/2008 Pleaded guilty to the offense of bribery. 
 
John Bills 
10205 S. Springfield Ave, 





Indicted on charges involving fraud against 
the City of Chicago. 
 
Paul Simmons 
3326 Ridge Road 





Charged for felony theft committed against 
Chicago Public Schools. 
 
Americopy 
3326 Ridge Road 





Controlling person charged for felony theft 
committed against Chicago Public Schools. 
 
Timothy Mason 
26092 Cresta Verde 





Indicted on charges involving fraud against 
the City of Chicago. 
 
Mariana Gerzanych 
26092 Cresta Verde 





Indicted on charges involving fraud against 
the City of Chicago. 
 
Clyde Williams 7 
Chicago Avenue 





Charges involving theft against the City of 
Chicago. 
 
PJ’s Ace Hardware, Inc. 
7 Chicago Avenue 


















Koziol Car Wash, Inc. 
 
1/17/2018 




349 W. 31st Street 





Charges involving theft against the City of 
Chicago. 
 
Natalie M. Balzano 
349 W. 31st Street 





Charges involving theft against the City of 
Chicago. 
J & J Soft Cloth Car 
Wash 
349 W. 31st Street 












7200 S. Exchange Suite 
A PO Box 490050 







Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation 
to a City of Chicago contract. 
 
 
McClendon Holdings   
& Affiliates 7200   
S. Exchange Suite A   
PO Box 490050  Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation 
Chicago, IL 60649 4/15/2018 to a City of Chicago contract. 
 
Lester Coleman 
7258 S. Halsted St. 





Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation 





7258 S. Halsted St. 







Indicted on charges involving fraud in relation 
to Chicago Housing Authority contracts. 
 
